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“Our Main Story Tonight Is…”: Introducing John Oliver 
There was a time, only decades ago, that Americans in search of something to 
watch had a relatively limited selection. An American viewer of the 1950s and 1960s 
might sit on the couch and look at ABC, NBC, or CBS, but would have little choice 
outside those three major networks. This lack of choice extended not only to 
entertainment television, but also to the news. Anyone itching to learn about current 
events on television could only do so by watching one of the main networks. Thus, the 
anchors of those shows were important figures in civic discourse, and were widely 
listened to by the public. Events like Edward R. Murrow’s rebuke of Senator Joe 
McCarthy’s witch hunt for communists or Walter Cronkite’s call for a diplomatic end to 
the war in Vietnam were journalistic shots heard round the country (Adams, Martin). The 
newsman, though few in number, was a crucial voice in America’s discourse.  
Since those halcyon days, the medium of television has undergone several rounds 
of tectonic shifts. Viewers who, fifty years ago, would have heard the news from 
Cronkite on CBS, John Daly on ABC, or Chet Huntley and David Brinkley on NBC, now 
hear it from Christiane Amanpour, Ashleigh Banfield, Wolf Blitzer, Anderson Cooper, or 
Don Lemon–and that’s just CNN. The television news genre has ballooned from the 
evening slot on three channels to include a whole collection of networks–CNN, MSNBC, 
and FOX News, most notably–that broadcast the news all day, every day.  
The wealth of available news sources has both positive and negative implications. 
On one hand, the constant broadcast of news programming allows the American public to 
learn about important events going on around the world as they happen. No longer is 
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informational broadcasting sequestered to an hour each night; if you’re interested in 
hearing about what’s happening in the world, that information is only a channel change 
away. However, the expansion of the news media market also presents problematic 
elements. The American news media environment has become increasingly saturated and 
politicized compared to its state half a century ago. Networks and their anchors often 
seem to view the events of the day through a progressive (as on MSNBC) or conservative 
(as on FOX News) lens, and commentators like Rachel Maddow on the left and Bill 
O’Reilly on the right have become major and politically-biased voices in a field once 
entirely focused on objectivity (Mitchell et. al). Cronkite’s vocal opposition to the 
Vietnam War was notable partly in that, at the time, it was uncommon for a newscaster to 
openly state their opinion on the government’s decisions. Now, it’s uncommon if a FOX 
News anchor doesn’t do that by noon.  
The freedom of the press given by the Constitution positions American news 
media outlets as watchers for the American democracy, but the expansion of the news 
media industry has affected the nature of this coverage in ways that no one could have 
imagined decades ago. This begs the question: who watches the watchers? After taking 
over for Craig Kilborn in 1999, Jon Stewart weaponized Comedy Central’s ​The Daily 
Show​ as a site not only of news parody, but also of news critique. Stewart drew from the 
blueprints laid out by ​Saturday Night Live​’s “Weekend Update” and by his predecessor to 
create a show that not only lampooned the seriousness and content of the news, but also 
criticizing the efficacy with which the news media was fulfilling their duty.  
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While Stewart was initially the only one performing this role, he would soon be 
joined by an enclave of similarly-minded comedian-critics, many of whom were 
themselves graduates of ​The Daily Show​. ​The Colbert Report​ (2005), hosted by Stephen 
Colbert, introduced a parody with personalities like O’Reilly to the genre, using the 
rhetoric and tropes of conservative punditry as a vehicle through which to criticize that 
very same punditry. When Colbert left Comedy Central to fill what had been David 
Letterman’s seat on CBS’ ​The Late Show​ in early 2015, his post-​Daily Show​ slot was 
filled by Larry Wilmore’s ​The Nightly Show , which was cancelled in 2016 (Carter 2015). 1
Wilmore, who had a recurring role on ​The Daily Show​ as the shows “Senior Black 
Correspondent,” was the first host of a show in the ​Daily Show​ mold who was not a white 
male. Later that year, Stewart left ​The Daily Show​, to be replaced by Trevor Noah, a 
biracial South African man and another ​Daily Show​ alumnus. In 2016, longtime ​Daily 
Show​ correspondent Samantha Bee released her own show, ​Full Frontal​, on TBS, 
becoming the first woman to host such a show (Chavez). In the years following Stewart’s 
rise as a cultural critic, the humorous alternative news source genre has expanded to 
include a number of different hosts from a number of different backgrounds.  
Another ​Daily Show​ alum who has gone on to find success on his own is John 
Oliver, a British comedian who spent the summer of 2013 filling in for Stewart behind 
the desk of ​The Daily Show​, now hosts his own show, ​Last Week Tonight​, which 
premiered on HBO in April of 2014. Oliver has made a few important changes to the 
political comedy-news genre yet to be explored by his fellow ​Daily Show​ alumni. A team 
1 ​Originally, the show was slated to be named ​The Minority Report with Larry Wilmore​ (Carter 2015).  
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of correspondents like the ones on ​The Daily Show​ and ​Full Frontal​ is nowhere to be 
found on ​Last Week Tonight​. Oliver speaks as himself, not through a parodic pundit 
persona. Furthermore, the interview segments that were a staple of ​The Colbert Report 
and continue to be of ​TDS​ are almost always absent. On ​Last Week Tonight​, John Oliver 
abandons elements like correspondents, interviews, and personae, distancing himself 
from the news parody on which the genre cut its teeth. 
More so than any of its predecessors or contemporaries, ​Last Week Tonight ​is 
more than just a platform for critique. Every episode of ​Last Week Tonight​ has what 
Oliver refers to as a “main story,” one issue or topic to which Oliver typically devotes 15 
to 20 minutes of discussion. These segments focus not only on entertainment, but also on 
information. The topics Oliver chooses are generally political, and in discussing them, 
Oliver hopes to alert his viewers to the political problems tied to those topics. In the past, 
Oliver has used these segments to cover a wide range of topics, including student debt, 
the tobacco industry, transgender rights, and daily fantasy sports. Whereas Stewart and 
the hosts who followed him largely limit their focus to current events, Oliver exercises 
more discretion by switching between topics related to current events and more general 
topics as he pleases. As the regular presence of jokes, sarcasm and humor attests, ​Last 
Week Tonight​ does not represent a move away from the entertainment-focused side of the 
alternative news source, but the show does represent a substantial move toward the 
informative. Whereas Jon Stewart used his show to show his audience that the American 
news media wasn’t doing their job the way they were supposed to, Oliver’s focus was 
more on highlighting issues the mainstream American news media wasn’t.  
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This is especially evident in Oliver’s coverage of the 2016 presidential election. 
The 2016 election was characterized, as Oliver argues in his season-ending post-election 
discussion, in part by a mainstream news media that “waited far too long to take Trump 
seriously” (Oliver 2016g 10:17). On his show, it would seem, Oliver worked to avoid this 
pitfall. While mainstream news outlets marvelled at the outrageous statements 
continually made by Trump on his twitter, Oliver conducted an examination of the 
viability of his proposed border wall (Oliver 2016b). As most news outlets were 
witnessing dramatic primary seasons on both sides of the aisle, Oliver sought to convey 
how the processes worked, and how they could be reformed (Oliver 2016c). After 
Trump’s victory, the comedian offered his audience a laundry list of things they could do 
to resist the new president (Oliver 2016g). In these segments, Oliver wasn’t just making 
jokes or critiquing the media; he was working to give his audiences the knowledge and 
resources they would need to participate in American democracy most effectively. 
Thus, on ​Last Week Tonight​, John Oliver attempts to strike a balance between 
political humor and informative programming. This balance is, as prior academic study of 
Stewart and Colbert has revealed, a difficult one presenting a number of potential 
problems. However, Oliver’s show and its particularities as an alternative news source 
remain relatively new, and academic work on the subject remains scant. This study seeks 
to contribute to early academic conversations of the late night host.  
In this paper, I examine the seven “main story” segments of ​Last Week Tonight​’s 
third season whose topics pertained directly to the events and major candidates of the 
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2016 Presidential election . Using Burke’s theory of frames of acceptance and rejection 2
to analyze Oliver’s rhetoric in these segments, I argue that John Oliver uses 
evidence-oriented argument and contextual clash to speak with knowledge to a 
nonspecialist audience on a variety of issues relevant to their decision in the upcoming 
election, thereby embodying a performance of public intellect. In doing so, Oliver frames 
himself as a hero attempting to correct villains of two types: voters ​tricked​ by the allure 
of Donald Trump and his conservative platform, and politicians and media members 
mistaken​ in their contentedness with the political status quo or in their support of their 
agenda. At the same time, Oliver’s use of humor attacks those politicians, reducing their 
beliefs and actions to absurdities, thereby compounding the perception of those villains as 
mistaken and unintelligent. Thus, I argue that Oliver’s performance is one both of comic 
acceptance and burlesque rejection designed to encourage his viewers towards a more 
active and complex understanding of their democracy as well as their role within it.  
 
  
2 They are, in chronological order: “Donald Trump” (Episode 303; February 28, 2016), “Border Wall” 
(Episode 306; March 20, 2016), “Primaries and Caucuses” (Episode 313; May 22, 2016), “Republican 
National Convention” (Episode 318; July 24, 2016), “Democratic National Convention” (Episode 319; July 
31, 2016), “Scandals” (Episode 323; September 25, 2016), and “President-Elect Trump” (Episode 330; 
November 13, 2016).  
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The Men Behind the Desk: A History of the Political Comedy News Host 
As a politically-focused late-night comedy news program, ​Last Week Tonight with 
John Oliver​ situates itself within an already existing canon of topical political news 
shows. However, political comedy was not nearly as popular a genre in the early days of 
television as it is now. Late night hosts like Johnny Carson of NBC’s ​The Tonight Show 
would comb headlines for stand-up material, sharing their “sardonic insights into the 
absurdities of the American experience,” but this humor was rarely political (Buxton 
380). Carson, a nationally beloved figure, remained as apolitical as possible, for fear of 
losing a large portion of his audience (Bushkin 154-155; Buxton 380). For example, on 
the 5th anniversary of Richard Nixon’s ouster from the presidency, Carson told his 
audience that Nixon had celebrated the occasion “by reciting his famous ‘Checkers’ 
speech” (Carson 0:55). Making jokes about Watergate was easy for Carson because 
outrage against the Nixon administration was more or less universal, and even then, 
Carson’s joke poked fun at Nixon’s ego rather than his transgressions. More controversial 
topics, such as abortion, were simply avoided entirely (Buxton 380). ​The Tonight Show 
gave Americans an outlet that used topical comedy to talk about politics which was 
unlikely to offend their sensibilities because it was averse to stating a political opinion.  
Carson’s desire to avoid politicizing the content of his show was shared across 
television at the time (Peterson 2008a 32-33). While there were some exceptions to this 
rule, forays into the realm of politics were usually met with significant resistance, often 
on the part of the networks. ​That Was the Week That Was​ (or ​TW3​), a news parody show 
preceding programs like ​Saturday Night Live’s​ “Weekend Update” and ​The Daily Show​, 
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was one such program which laid important groundwork for the shows that would follow. 
The show, which premiered in 1964, was an American adaptation of a 1962 British show 
by the same name which was cancelled only a year after its initial release for political 
reasons (Hastings). ​TW3​’s format featured a theme song recapping the week’s events, 
then alternated between newscast-esque monologues from David Frost, the show’s host, 
and skits satirizing important events of the week (“That Was The Week That Was”). The 
show, whose regulars also included Alan Alda, Pat Englund, and Buck Henry (who 
would later write for ​SNL​’s “Weekend Update”), was no stranger to controversy, readily 
discussing political issues throughout its 16 month run (“That Was”). Like its British 
precursor, it was cancelled in 1965, only a year after it premiered (Peterson 2008a 33). 
While political comedy seemed ready for primetime, primetime remained unready for 
political comedy.  
As the sixties drew to a close and “left in their wake a more skeptical and cynical 
nation,” shows like ​All in the Family​ began to address issues such as racism, sexism, and 
the Vietnam War and were well received by the public (Peterson 2008a 34). However, it 
was not until the 1970s that political comedy reached the mainstream of American 
television. Peterson argues that the event begetting this change was Richard Nixon’s 
1972 Watergate scandal (Peterson 2008a 34). The scandal, which Peterson names as one 
of the few occasions “in which reality literally outstripped satire,” made political humor 
accessible because it “played to Americans’ basest anti-political suspicions, revealing 
corruption so deep and so fundamental as to transcend partisan argument” (Peterson 
2008a 34). Whereas issues such as the Vietnam War or the Civil Rights movement were 
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divisive enough to warrant networks prohibiting their discussion by comedy shows, 
Nixon’s transgressions were universally agreed upon to be wrong, offering Americans an 
opportunity for unity via popular disgust. Comedians across the country seized the 
opportunity to make light of the incident, perhaps most prominently Johnny Carson 
(Peterson 2008a 34-35). Critic John Leonard noted that, “When [Johnny Carson] began 
making Watergate jokes,... we knew it was permissible to ridicule the president” 
(Leonard quoted in Peterson 2008a 35). The Watergate Scandal acted as somewhat of a 
watershed moment for political comedy because it created an environment where the 
genre was more publicly accepted.  
Public warming to political ridicule allowed for the introduction of a program 
which would play a formative role in the development of televisual political comedy: 
Saturday Night Live​. Premiering in 1975, ​SNL​ was a hit from the start, attracting the 
attention of tens of millions of viewers (Reincheld 190). The show’s format was that of a 
sketch comedy variety show whose sketches took place in a variety of different contexts, 
including political ones. Political sketches frequently involved the use of some sort of 
impression on the part of the actors, and these impressions were highly influential. Chevy 
Chase’s impression of President Gerald Ford–which was more based on Chase’s acting 
confused and falling down a lot than it was on looking or sounding like the 38th 
president–became so popular that Ford’s press secretary went on the show hoping to seal 
the wound the impression’s popularity had created (Peterson 2008a 36).The popularity of 
the impression had enough of an effect on public perception of the President as to compel 
the administration to respond. From early on in its run on NBC, ​Saturday Night Live 
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demonstrated the capacity of comedy shows to discuss politics in a popular and 
humorous context. 
But impression is not the only means through which ​Saturday Night Live​ practices 
political comedy. Since the show’s inception, a fixture of the program has been 
“Weekend Update,” a news parody segment generally lasting between five and ten 
minutes (Reincheld 191). The segment–which first featured Chevy Chase as its 
anchor–aired at the midpoint of the program, serving as an incentive for people to 
continue watching through the first half of the show and providing a “second start” to 
retain viewers’ interest (Reincheld 192). “Weekend Update” featured one to two cast 
members dressed as newscasters “sitting behind an anchor's desk, reading the news of the 
week... accompanied by pictures, copies of newspaper clippings, and graphics” 
(Reincheld 191). Rather than impersonating another news anchor, “Weekend Update” 
anchors such as Chase and those that followed used their own names. The stories they 
reported were real stories from the previous week, sometimes even from half an hour 
before ​SNL​’s 11:30 start time (Reincheld 193). It even drew its name from a similarly 
titled 10 PM news program on NBC at the time (Reincheld 192). In many ways, 
“Weekend Update” seemed quite similar to its mainstream news counterparts, and this 
proximity was by design.  
 Once the segment began, however, its status as a news parody would become 
immediately apparent. Chase began each segment with the same refrain: “Good evening. 
I’m Chevy Chase, and you’re not.” The catchphrase was a play on similar catchphrases 
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used by mainstream news anchors such as Roger Grimsby , designed to poke fun at the 3
self-importance of such slogans (Reincheld 192). Following Chase’s departure after the 
show’s first season and subsequent replacement with the duo of Dan Akroyd and Jane 
Curtin, the segment began to borrow more elements from its mainstream counterparts. 
One such addition to the segment was a parody of “Point/Counterpoint,” itself a segment 
on CBS’s ​60 Minutes​ (Reincheld 191). In its original, non-parodic form, 
“Point/Counterpoint” featured two political commentators–one liberal and one 
conservative–debating an issue or question for a few minutes each episode (“James J. 
Kirkpatrick”). The “Weekend Update” version did much the same, with Curtin 
representing the liberal point of view and Akroyd the conservative, though their version 
came complete with insults such as the now-famous “Jane, you ignorant slut” (Reincheld 
192). In taking its aesthetic and formal cues from mainstream news, “Weekend Update” 
provided a strong platform for parody and critique of those programs.  
Reincheld notes that, while the focus of “Weekend Update” was largely comical, 
showrunner Lorne Michaels intended Weekend Update “to be considered a serious voice 
in the American political landscape and to serve an informational purpose” (Reincheld 
191). Though ​SNL​ made political jokes throughout its programming, “Weekend Update” 
offered a more direct outlet for political humor. 
SNL​ was an important step forward in the political comedy genre not only 
because of its content but also because of its popularity. Reincheld notes that “between 
1975 and 1980, Weekend Update reached an audience of about 30 million people, 
3 ​Grimsby was known for his slogan, “Good Evening, I’m Roger Grimsby, here now the news” (Reincheld 
191).  
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disseminating alternative points of view on the sometimes important and sometimes 
outlandish events of the week” (Reincheld 190). The sustained popularity of the show 
made it a consistent presence in popular culture, thus entrenching its news parody firmly 
within American civic discourse. Furthermore, the political focus of ​Saturday Night Live 
was far from unintentional. Michaels “intended ‘SNL,’ and Weekend Update especially, 
to be considered a serious voice in the American political landscape and to serve an 
informational purpose” (Michaels quoted in Reincheld 191). ​Saturday Night Live​ set a 
precedent for explicitly political comedy shows, and the weekly inclusion of “Weekend 
Update” popularized the comedy news model that many would build on in the future.  
One of the most significant programs to follow ​Weekend Update​’s lead was ​The 
Daily Show​, which premiered on Comedy Central on July 21, 1996 (James 1996). 
Created by Lizz Winstead and Madeleine Smithberg and first hosted by Craig 
Kilborn–who hosted the show from its first episode until December of 1998–​The Daily 
Show​ took several cues from “Weekend Update” (Adalian 1998). Like “Update” before 
it, ​The Daily Show​ took many of its aesthetic and formal cues from mainstream news 
programs. After a brief introductory graphic, the opening shot would be on Kilborn, 
wearing a suit and sitting behind a desk (Grimes). Unlike its predecessor, however, ​The 
Daily Show​ ran a full half hour (closer to twenty-one minutes once commercials were 
accounted for) for each installment, rather than the five to ten minutes allotted to 
“Weekend Update.” 
Winstead, Smithberg, and Kilborn used this extra time to pursue a more involved 
and developed parody of mainstream news programs. Though their proportions varied, 
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most episodes of Kilborn’s ​Daily Show​ involved three main ingredients: an “Update” 
style reading of the news of the day by Kilborn, “investigative” reports pursued on 
location by the show’s faux news correspondents, and an in-studio interview with a 
celebrity who would have to answer Kilborn’s “Five Questions” (MacGregor). The show 
even included commercial lead-outs such as “This Day in Hasselhoff History,” “Last 
Weekend’s Top-Grossing Films, Converted into Lira,” or an audio recording of 
Winstead’s parents reading the question and answer from the previous night’s “Final 
Jeopardy” into an answering machine, a clear parody of shows like ​Entertainment 
Tonight​ (James). Thus, ​The Daily Show ​used its more substantial runtime to critique a not 
only the news television, but also celebrity television and game shows. 
Despite its brief forays into poking fun at programs like ​E.T.​, ​The Daily Show 
focused on mimicking mainstream news programs. The behind-the-desk monologue was 
quite similar to the format employed by Chase and those who followed him on “Update”: 
Kilborn would sit behind the “news” desk, offering irreverent takes on the day’s 
important events (James). As with “Update,” Kilborn appeared as himself, and the the 
news stories he reported were ripped straight from the headlines. However, Kilborn’s 
monologues made light of the events in the news rather than using those events as a 
platform for political critique; if there was a story in the news one day about Bob Dole, 
Kilborn’s take was likely to have more to do with Dole’s age than with his political 
beliefs (James). While some stories covered politics, others stayed away from the subject 
(Roberts). The focus of Kilborn’s monologue was to offer a recap of the day’s events 
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while lampooning the way mainstream newscasters fulfilled the task with such 
seriousness; thus, it was more or less a “silly” version of the news.  
The “investigative” reports on the show were similarly irreverent in their parody 
of mainstream news. The correspondents, who frequently flew to locations across the 
country for their reports, approached their segments with an irreverence similar to that of 
Kilborn. On one episode, for example, Brian Unger ventured to the Warner Brothers store 
on 5th Avenue in New York City in search of answers as to why the cartoon character 
Speedy Gonzalez received such a small part in the 1996 film ​Space Jam​. On another, 
Winstead donned a flak jacket while reporting “from the front lines of America’s 
least-known ethnic conflict:” that between Norwegians and Swedes in Minnesota 
(Grimes). As with the news stories Kilborn covered during his monologues, the stories 
the correspondents covered were real, often lifted from the headlines of local newspapers 
around the country (Grimes). ​The Daily Show​’s investigative correspondents covered 
stories which, by the very act of being covered by a “news” program of any kind, were 
hilarious.  
In another recurring segment, “God Stuff,” correspondent John Bloom simply 
presented humorous moments from speeches given by television evangelists, without 
comment (Grimes). In presenting real stories, correspondents and recurring segments on 
The Daily Show​ highlighted the absurdity of the events and people they covered, as if to 
ask audiences, “can you believe that real news shows actually cover this stuff?” Much 
like “Weekend Update,” ​The Daily Show​ drew its aesthetic and formal cues from real 
news programs, using real events, excerpts of speeches, and local news stories to point 
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out the general absurdity of news shows, while not quite reaching the level of satire or 
critique which would later be brought to the program.  
Craig Kilborn’s ​Daily Show​ was well received, but was criticized for lack of 
originality. Reviewers found the show funny, but frequently made comparisons to 
“Weekend Update,” lamenting how close an approximation TDS was to those five- to 
ten-minute segments (Grimes; James; MacGregor). Though the format remained 
unchanged, complaints of the show’s proximity to “Update” were not the reason for 
Kilborn’s departure. Even as the show began to develop more popularity in the year and a 
half following its premiere, Kilborn and Winstead’s working relationship had already 
begun to deteriorate. Tensions between Kilborn and Winstead boiled over when Kilborn 
made inappropriate remarks in an interview with ​Esquire Magazine​ released in December 
of 1997 about the female members of the show’s writing staff, adding that Winstead 
found him attractive and would perform sexual acts on him if he asked (Richmond 1997). 
Kilborn was suspended without pay for one week, and when he returned in January for 
what would be his last year with the show, Winstead had left the program (Richmond 
1998). That summer, Kilborn signed a contract to replace Tom Snyder on CBS’ “Late 
Late Show,” and Comedy Central’s replacement, a comedian named Jon Stewart, 
officially took over on January 11th, 1999 (Katz). This switch jumpstarted a transition in 
The Daily Show​ which made it one of the most important alternative news programs in 
the history of television.  
While the two iterations of ​TDS​ shared a great deal of similarities, the focus and 
subject of their parody–and, more so in Stewart’s case, satire–were different. The Kilborn 
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iteration was, above all, a spoof of local news, and any national or international news was 
presented in such a way as to “highlight the glib superficiality of a smarmy local-news 
anchor” (Tally 155). The correspondent reports also had the trappings of a local news 
spoof rather than a national one, complete with a news van and handy technology like the 
TDS 5000 color copier (Tally 155). On Kilborn’s show, the subjects of critique were the 
content of the news and the manner in which it was delivered.  
In contrast, Stewart’s iteration of the show was “a satirical critique ​of​ the media 
by​ the media;” Stewart was making fun of the people who read the news while also 
criticizing them for what Stewart felt was an insufficient fulfilment of their duty to 
inform the American people (Tally 157). Stewart’s show focused on trying to understand 
why some issues or discussions dominated the media while other important social issues 
remained undiscussed (Tally 157). Because of this satirical focus on the media rather than 
a parodic focus on the content of the news, Stewart’s version of the program was able to 
execute a more effective critique of mainstream news media than his predecessor.  
Without making meaningful changes to the formal structure of the show, Jon 
Stewart enacted a major shift in the subject. Stewart maintained a much sharper focus on 
national news, preferring to stay as up to date as possible on current events (Tally 157). 
This focus extended to his team of correspondents as well. In 2007, correspondent Rob 
Riggle–who years earlier had served a tour of duty as a Marine in Afghanistan–gave a 
week of reports from Iraq in a recurring segment called "Operation Silent Thunder: 'The 
Daily Show' in Iraq," lending an exceedingly authentic perspective to ​The Daily Show​’s 
coverage of the Iraq War (McCarthy). In the introductory segment, Riggle reports in from 
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an American military base in Iraq and competes with Aasif Mandvi (appearing in front of 
a green screen) to convince Stewart that he is truly in Iraq (Stewart 2007, 0:31). To 
demonstrate the veracity of his claim, Riggle offers Stewart and the audience a clip 
compilation of him riding in several different military vehicles. Stewart believes him, and 
asks Riggle for his report, at which point Riggle reveals he has no information to share. 
Riggle’s segment is thus simultaneously a parody of reporters traveling to Iraq to cover 
the war and a statement on the general uselessness of similar reports from mainstream 
news outlets. With Stewart at the helm, ​The Daily Show​ was able to substantially shift the 
scope of its coverage, expanding its critical vision to include international stories.  
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart​, as it came to be called once he took the reins, 
was markedly more popular than the show had been with Kilborn at the helm. This 
popularity, however, would not come all at once. Despite a strong opening week, 
Stewart’s ratings during his first few weeks as anchor were 14% lower than his 
predecessor’s during the same time span a year earlier (Adalian 1999). By March, his 
third month with the show, Stewart and his producers were able to turn things around, 
beating out August 1998 to become the show’s most successful month in its three year 
history (Katz). By his third month behind the ​Daily Show​ desk, Stewart had already 
surpassed his predecessor in his popularity. 
As Stewart’s tenure continued, the show became increasingly popular, and 
Stewart began transcend his role as a comedian, becoming a stronger voice in American 
pop culture and contributing more meaningfully to civic discourse. This development in 
Stewart’s voice came on the heels of tragedy. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
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attacks, several major television personalities–Stewart included–cancelled their shows 
until the beginning of the next week (Carter 2001). When they did return, they did so on a 
more somber note; David Letterman substituted his usual stand-up monologue for a 
statement on the tragedy, and Bill Maher’s ​Politically Incorrect​ left an open chair at the 
table for a series regular who had perished in one of the plane crash (“When Can We 
Laugh Again”). Stewart stayed off the air a little longer than his colleagues, not returning 
until Thursday, September 20th (“Jon Stewart Returns to TV”). In the opening segment 
of the show, usually reserved for comedy, Stewart asked of the audience, “Are you 
okay?” and apologized in advance for starting the episode with another “overwrought 
speech of a shaken host” (Stewart 0:15). In the nine-minute monologue which followed, 
Stewart fought through tears as he lauded first responders and discussed the capacity of 
Americans to come together and break down barriers in the face of tragedy. In the 
episode, Stewart made himself vulnerable, and became someone with whom the show’s 
audience could not only laugh, but empathize. When Stewart stepped down from the 
show’s anchor chair in 2015, his September 20th monologue was considered by many 
journalists to be one of the defining moments of his tenure (Berman; Poniewozik 2015).  
That one of the moments that helped make Stewart one of the most prominent 
voices in American popular culture was arguably also his least comedic is ironic, but also 
revealing of the type of figure Stewart was becoming. The September 20th episode set a 
precedent for Stewart’s use of a more serious and earnest voice, and this put him in a 
complicated position within American civic discourse. Through the use of this voice, 
Stewart established himself not only as a comedian, but as an important cultural critic.  
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Stewart’s transition from a comedian to a media critic is also evident in his 
September 2004 interview on ​Crossfire​, a CNN program in which two pundits–one from 
the left assisted by liberal host Paul Begala, and one on the right assisted by conservative 
host Tucker Carlson–would debate a relevant political issue (Stanley 2004). Stewart 
opened the interview by imploring Begala and Carlson to “stop,” arguing that the two 
were “failing miserably” in their “responsibility to the public discourse” (“CNN 
Crossfire”). The ensuing discussion featured many moments of conflict between Stewart 
and Begala and Carlson. In one, Stewart called the duo “partisan hacks,” arguing that 
shows like ​Crossfire ​and their emphasis on theatricalized debate had become “part of 
their/[politicians’] strategies” (“CNN Crossfire”). In another, Carlson chided Stewart’s 
refusal to play the role of the comedian, adding  that he found Stewart’s lectures “boring” 
(“CNN Crossfire”). The interview provided Stewart an opportunity to criticize the media 
from a setting other than behind his desk, further strengthening his status as a media 
critic.  
The ​Crossfire​ interview was immensely important, both for Stewart and for CNN. 
The interview was streamed or downloaded from online over 1.5 million times, ironically 
exceeding the average viewer count of a ​Crossfire​ episode (Cave). Early the next year, 
CNN cancelled ​Crossfire​, and when asked about the reasons for the cancellation, 
then-network president Jonathan Klein cited Stewart’s appearance on the show, adding 
that he “[agreed] wholeheartedly with Jon Stewart’s overall premise” and that “the rest of 
CNN's prime-time lineup will be moving toward reporting the day's events and not 
discussing them” (Carter 2005). Stewart’s ​Crossfire​ interview triggered a change in the 
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nature of CNN’s programming, and thus presents a strong example of his influence as a 
media critic within America’s civic discourse. 
However, the ​Crossfire​ interview also raised an important question about 
Stewart’s role in American pop culture and civic discourse. Throughout the interview, 
Tucker Carlson called Stewart a hypocrite for criticizing ​Crossfire​, citing the soft 
questioning then-presidential hopeful John Kerry had received during a recent appearance 
on ​The Daily Show​ (“CNN Crossfire”). In response, Stewart argued that ​The Daily Show 
was not a news show, but a comedy show on a comedy channel, pointing out that “the 
show that leads into me is puppets making crank calls” (“CNN Crossfire”). Carlson’s 
complaint that Stewart was holding ​Crossfire​ to a higher standard of journalistic integrity 
than ​The Daily Show​ was grounded on a strictly dichotomous conception of civic 
discourse “explicitly dividing comedic and non-comedic discourse” (Carlson & Peifer 
339). The mainstream news media’s questioning of Stewart’s role points to an important 
truth about Jon Stewart, and about those who would follow in his footsteps: that the 
format provided by their comedy shows gave them leeway to speak on important issues 
while remaining unbounded to journalistic commitments to objectivity.  
This is evident in Stewart’s continued public advocacy in the years following the 
Crossfire​ interview. In 2010, Stewart co-hosted the Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear 
with Stephen Colbert. The event was partly a tongue-in-cheek response to the Restoring 
Honor rally led by Glenn Beck a few months prior, but during it, Stewart also made a 
sincere plea for a return to more civil political discourse (Tavernise & Stelter). Later that 
year, Stewart devoted the entirety of his last episode of the year to discussing the Zadroga 
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Bill, a measure to offer medical care to 9/11 first responders which was stalled in the 
senate at the time (Carter & Stelter). Over the course of the episode, Stewart openly 
criticized not only the lawmakers responsible for the bill’s stalling, claiming Senate 
Republicans had years before “turned 9/11 into a catchphrase,” and also the mainstream 
news networks for not sufficiently reporting on the bill (Carter & Stelter).  Five years 
later, when the Zadroga Act was set to expire, Stewart filmed a guest segment for ​The 
Daily Show​ (at this point hosted by Trevor Noah), traveling to Washington, D.C. with a 
group of 9/11 first responders to ask senators why they hadn’t come out in support of the 
act’s reauthorization (Kreps). In his March to Restore Sanity and and his full-throated 
support of the Zadroga Act and its reauthorization, Stewart played the role of public 
advocate, something seldom done by his contemporaries at the time.  
 The two instances were clear calls for action–in one case, Stewart advocated a 
return to more civil discourse; in another, he fought actively and openly for legislative 
progress. It was a move that drew Stewart even further away from the traditional 
late-night host and closer to the likes of Edward R. Murrow or Walter Cronkite, two 
newscasters who had spoken publicly against Senator Joe McCarthy’s heavy-handed 
anti-communist policies and the Vietnam War, respectively (Bushkin 154-155; Carter & 
Stelter). However, rather than being a part of the mainstream news media like Cronkite 
and Murrow were, Stewart conducted his activism in the context of the media criticism. 
Stewart’s tendency to speak out on important issues, coupled with his show’s network 
news-like aesthetic, was thus a critical part of Stewart’s development as a central pop 
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culture voice; by being more than a comedian, he was able to craft himself as someone 
with whom Americans could empathize. 
In the summer of 2013, Jon Stewart took a twelve-week hiatus from the show in 
order to direct the movie ​Rosewater​, which would be his directorial debut (Carr 2013). 
For that summer, his seat behind the news desk was occupied by John Oliver, a British 
comedian born and raised in Birmingham, England who had joined ​The Daily Show​ as its 
“senior British correspondent” in 2006(Carr 2013). Over the course of Oliver’s summer 
as host, he covered stories such as the search for Edward Snowden, Paula Deen’s racist 
comments, and Anthony Weiner (Busis). As the interim anchor of ​The Daily Show​, 
Oliver received predominantly positive reviews, with one reviewer calling the show 
without Stewart “almost too good,” though another did concede that Oliver was “not 
exactly great at steering interviews” (Paskin, Stanley 2013). Stewart returned at the end 
of the summer, and Oliver resumed his role as correspondent until leaving the show a few 
months later to start his own project, further detailed later in this chapter.  
The Daily Show​’s critical success during Stewart’s tenure speaks to the popularity 
of this voice. The show won its first Peabody Award for its “Indecision 2000” coverage 
of the 2000 presidential election (“The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Indecision 2000”). 
Four years later, the show won another, again for its election coverage, and it received an 
institutional award in 2015 (“The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Indecision 2004”; 
“Institutional Award”). Between 2001 and 2015, the show won twenty-three Emmys, and 
was nominated for sixty (“The Daily Show With Jon Stewart | Television Academy”). In 
September of 2004, Stewart and his team of correspondents (who at that point included 
 
Nott 26 
Stephen Colbert, Samantha Bee, Ed Helms, and Rob Corddry) ventured outside the 
medium of television and released a book titled ​America (the Book): A Citizen’s Guide to 
Democracy Inaction​; by October of the same year, it was on the ​New York Times​’ 
nonfiction Bestseller List (“Best Sellers”). In 2010, Stewart released ​Earth (the Book): A 
Visitor’s Guide to the Human Race​, another fake textbook which used “a faux-scientific 
tone to explain the planet, its life forms and their quantifiable characteristics” to 
hypothetical alien visitors (Maslin). Also like its predecessor, it spent several weeks on 
the ​New York Times​ Bestseller list (“Hardcover Nonfiction”). During Stewart’s tenure, 
The Daily Show​ went from a modest success to a much larger one. 
The extent of ​The Daily Show​’s success suggested that the show’s model of 
satirical news parody as social and political criticism could be successfully replicated. 
This theory was first tested by former ​TDS ​correspondent Stephen Colbert. Colbert, who 
joined ​The Daily Show​’s correspondent staff in 1997, described his persona on the show 
as that of “a fool who has spent a lot of his life playing not the fool” while still able to 
cover the news “at least well enough to deal with the subjects that he deals with” (Colbert 
quoted in P. 4). He also tried his hand at pundit mockery; he and Steve Carrell, who at the 
time was also a correspondent for the show, hosted a regular segment called “Even 
Stevphen,” [sic] another lampoon of “Point/Counterpoint” where the two took opposite 
sides of an issue, quickly foregoing any semblance of civil discourse to begin screaming 
at one another (McGrath). Colbert became one of the most popular correspondents on the 
show, even occasionally filling in for Stewart when the need arose (Mnookin). In 2005, 
after eight years as a ​Daily Show​ correspondent, Colbert leveraged this popularity into his 
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own spinoff show directly following Stewart in ​The Colbert Report​, which first aired on 
October 17, 2005 (Steinberg).  
Formally speaking, ​The Colbert Report​ and ​The Daily Show​ were relatively 
similar. Both drew aesthetic cues from mainstream news programs, and while Colbert’s 
show did not often feature correspondents, both shows generally had two segments of 
original content followed by an interview with a celebrity or important political figure 
during the last segment of the show. Furthermore, both ​The Colbert Report​ and ​The Daily 
Show​ enacted satires of mainstream news networks. However, the two shows were 
distinguished by a crucial difference: Jon Stewart hosted his show as himself, while 
Colbert hosted his in character. Colbert built upon the pundit persona he had developed 
as a correspondent, using it as a medium through which to parody and satirize cable news 
shows “dominated by the personality and sensibility of a single host,” and especially that 
of Bill O’Reilly, who Colbert’s on-show persona referred to as “Papa Bear” (Steinberg; 
Day). In fact, ​The Colbert Report​ was such a pointed sendup of ​The O’Reilly Factor​ that 
Colbert regularly featured a segment called “The Word,” a clear parody of O’Reilly’s 
“Talking Points Memo” segment, where Colbert’s vocal comic persona shared the screen 
with satirical text meant to illustrate the absurdity of the vocal Colbert’s argument 
(Waisanen 125). Rather than simply discussing the absurdity of network news punditry, 
Colbert chose to enact it.  
Just as Jon Stewart had done on ​The Daily Show​, Colbert used his particular brand 
of criticism for more-than-comedic purposes; he became a cultural critic in his own right. 
In assuming a persona similar to that of a network news personality, Colbert sought to 
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reveal the absurdity of those personalities–as well as the political beliefs they held–by 
“first embodying the opposition by way of his character, and then exposing it as the fool” 
(Bishop 553). He accomplished this in part by taking an “illustrating-absurdity-by-doing” 
approach to his satire. In 2010, Colbert appeared before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International 
Law to testify in “support”of the “Take Our Jobs” program–an effort by the United Farm 
Workers of America to challenge American citizens to take on farm jobs typically done 
by undocumented workers–in which he had participated for a day as a segment on his 
show (Bishop 548). Conducting his whole testimony in character, Colbert brought his 
comedic voice into a non-comedic space, embodying the position of someone against the 
use of migrant labor in order to dismantle the argument from the inside out (Bishop 551). 
A year later, Colbert shifted his focus to illuminating the absurdity of Super PACs–by 
founding a Super PAC (Carr 2011). This satirical critique was an effective one; Colbert’s 
Super PAC saga not only increased viewers’ knowledge of Super PACs, but did so more 
effectively than other types of news media (Hardy et al. 330). Stephen Colbert’s hands-on 
approach to satire increased the show’s effectiveness as a vehicle for cultural critique.  
Much like ​The Daily Show​ before it, ​The Colbert Report​ was an immense 
commercial and critical success. The show’s premiere garnered 1.13 million viewers 
(Crupi). A year later, that number had ballooned to an average of 1.5 million nightly 
viewers (Spitznagel). ​The Colbert Report​ also received significant recognition from the 
award circuit. When ​The Colbert Report​ ended its run in December of 2014, the show 
had been nominated for forty one Emmys, winning seven (“The Colbert Report”). Two of 
 
Nott 29 
Colbert’s books–​A Colbert Christmas: The Greatest Gift of All!​ and ​America Again: 
Re-Becoming the Greatness We Never Weren't​–won Grammys in 2010 and 2014, 
respectively (Rich). Though he got his start as a correspondent on ​The Daily Show​, by the 
end of his tenure as a faux-conservative pundit, Colbert had cemented a legacy both for 
his show and his role in civic discourse on par with that of Stewart’s. 
The resounding success of ​The Colbert Report​ encouraged networks to consider 
ordering similar shows with hosts in the mold of Stewart and Colbert. The next comedian 
to be tapped for such a role would be John Oliver, Stewart’s substitute host in the 
summer of 2013. Impressed by Oliver’s turn at the helm of ​TDS​ in the summer of 2013, 
HBO offered him his own show, titled ​Last Week Tonight​, first airing on April 27, 2014 
(Pennington). Airing once a week (each Sunday) rather than four nights a week, ​Last 
Week Tonight​’s basic premise shared common characteristics not only with ​The Daily 
Show​ and ​The Colbert Report​ on a conceptual level, but also with ​That Was the Week 
that Was​ and ​Weekend Update​  (Pennington). Rather than focusing on recapping the 
events of each day, ​Last Week Tonight​ seeks to comedically and satirically reflect on the 
events of the week.  
Last Week Tonight​ and John Oliver draw important strategies from both Jon 
Stewart and Stephen Colbert, as well as from other important comedy news programs of 
the past. Like many of its predecessors, ​Last Week Tonight​’s set is distinctly similar to 
that of any mainstream news program; Oliver sits at a news desk, wearing a shirt, tie, and 
jacket, against a backdrop of a city skyline, albeit one featuring the Empire State 
Building, the Burj Khalifa, and the Sagrada Familia. By using this image, Oliver parodies 
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the backdrops often used by news programs. Like Stewart, Oliver avoids playing a 
character, instead choosing to represent himself in earnest. Also like both Stewart and 
Colbert, Oliver uses his show as a platform for cultural critique.  
Though ​Last Week Tonight​ draws many formal cues from its predecessors, it also 
features some crucial differences. Because it airs on HBO, ​Last Week Tonight​ has no 
commercial breaks; thus, each episode runs about twenty eight minutes total rather than 
the twenty one minutes given to Stewart or Colbert (Poniewozik). The format of the show 
is also different from that of ​TDS​ or ​Colbert​ in its lack of a weekly interview segment. 
Rather, Oliver spends the first segment of each week’s episode recapping a few important 
events or stories the week (Framke). Following this, Oliver embarks on a longer, more 
thematically-oriented segment meant to inform viewers on issues such as “exploitative 
televangelists, child labor exploitation, transgender rights, the widespread corruption in 
FIFA,” among other things (Framke). These segments typically range between fifteen 
and twenty minutes in length, and often occupy the remaining time in an episode. Though 
whole episodes are available only to HBO subscribers, these main segments are 
published on Youtube and can thus be viewed by anyone with access to the website.  
Social media is more of a focus for Oliver than it was for his predecessors. After 
abstaining from discussing presidential candidate Donald Trump throughout much of the 
2016 election season, Oliver devoted a 22-minute segment to questioning Trump’s 
reputation as a successful businessman (Pereira). After referencing a tweet from Trump 
chastising Jon Stewart for changing his last name from Liebowitz, Oliver pointed out that 
Trump’s ancestors had changed their name from Drumpf upon immigrating to the United 
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States and encouraged his viewers to use the hashtag “#makedonalddrumpfagain” 
(Pereira). The segment was immensely popular, garnering over 19 million views on 
Youtube in the eight days following its release, and the hashtag became popular on 
several social media sites (Koblin). The show also made baseball caps using the same 
slogan from the hashtag, which sold out in less than two weeks (Koblin). The practice of 
creating a hashtag has become established as a frequent strategy which Oliver uses to 
promote the visibility of his show. Through the inclusion of social media, Oliver was not 
only reached out to more viewers, but also used audience participation as a means of 
advancing his critique.  
On ​Last Week Tonight​, Oliver has also taken an approach similar to that taken by 
Colbert in order to illustrate the absurdity of certain rules or laws. Perhaps taking a page 
out of Colbert’s playbook, Oliver implemented an interesting approach during an August, 
2015 segment on the tax-exempt status of televangelist churches: he founded one himself. 
Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption collected thousands in donations, all of which were 
donated to Doctors Without Borders (Holmes). Just under a year later, to help his viewers 
understand the practice of debt-buying, where “companies that buy debt at pennies on the 
dollar and then either resell it even cheaper or try to collect it,” Oliver formed his own 
debt-buying agency, bought over $15 million in medical debt for just over $60,000, and 
then began the process of forgiving that debt (Holmes). When discussing both 
televangelism and debt-buying, Oliver used a hands-on strategy in illustrating the 
absurdity inherent in how both systems function. 
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Thus far, ​Last Week Tonight​ has found both no shortage of success, both 
commercial and critical. Reviews noted its proximity to the way ​The Daily Show​ had 
been during Oliver’s run, but many also noted that “that is, of course, not a bad thing at 
all” (Poniewozik). After five months on the air, ​Last Week Tonight​ was averaging 4.1 
million views per week “across TV airings and DVR, on-demand and HBO Go” 
(O’Connell). By February of 2016, that number had increased to 4.7 million viewers per 
week (Hensch). In 2015, ​Last Week Tonight​ won its first Emmy for Outstanding 
Interactive Program, and it has won three since, having been nominated for ten in total 
(“Last Week Tonight”), Now in the midst of just its third season, ​Last Week Tonight​ as a 
show, as well as John Oliver as a figure within American civic discourse, have become 
incredibly popular. Much like “Weekend Update” in 1975, ​The Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart​ in 1999, or ​The Colbert Report​ in 2005, ​Last Week Tonight​ presents a new 
development in the comedy news genre, one where the line between information and 
satire is further blurred than it was under either Stewart or Colbert. Therefore, I argue that 
the rhetorical study of the show is not only instructive, but crucial to our understanding of 
our ever-developing discursive landscape.  
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Watching the Watchers: A Review of Existing Literature 
Having premiered only a few years ago, ​Last Week Tonight​ is still a relatively 
new program, and has thus far been the subject of little academic work. However, its 
growing influence within the landscape of alternative news sources (as well as within 
American civic discourse generally) situates it squarely within an ongoing academic 
discussions of the role and function of alternative news sources. Principally, scholars 
have focused their attention on Jon Stewart’s ​The Daily Show​ and Stephen Colbert’s ​The 
Colbert Report​, two shows known for using the visual trappings of news media television 
as a platform to critique news media organizations.  
Part of this discussion has concerned the role of alternative news sources in 
American civic discourse, and whether their presence has constituted a positive 
development or a negative one. Hart and Hartelius argue Stewart is hurting civic 
discourse in America, going so far as to label him a “cynic” (Hart & Hartelius 264). They 
assert that, through the use of two tropes, the diatribe and the ​chreia​ (a ‘‘brief statement 
of an incident or situation followed by a pungent remark’’ (Cutler quoted in Hart & 
Hartelius 266)), Stewart makes cynicism an atmospheric mist “that hovers over [the 
American people] each day” (Hart & Hartelius 264). Hart and Hartelius see Stewart as a 
promoter of cynicism, consequently arguing his influence over American political 
discourse to be negative.  
Other scholars take a more positive view on Stewart’s influence. Bennett grants 
that Stewart may be a cynic, but argues that “singling out a comedian such as Jon Stewart 
with a charge of cynicism implies that the manners and conventions of our political times 
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are more generally high-minded and above reproach” (Bennett 279-280). For Bennett, 
Stewart’s cynicism is a product of his environment, and he asserts that “cynicism, when 
properly targeted, can redress the corruption of a political order that is widely and 
perhaps wisely held suspect by the public” (280). In contrast, Hariman offers that Stewart 
is not a cynic, but rather “rather a parodist, a satirist, a comic engaging in political humor 
in the manner of Aristophanes, Erasmus, Mark Twain, Will Rogers, Richard Pryor, Garry 
Trudeau, and many, many others, all of whom also could be accused of the additional 
crime of being popular” (Hariman 274). Further, he posits that Stewart’s show 
“continually calls the audience to informed participation, civil speech, and rational 
argument on behalf of sound public policy” (Hariman 274). In direct response to Hart and 
Hartelius, both Bennett and Hariman offer more positive accounts of Stewart’s comedy.  
Many scholars have come to understand late-night comedy news shows as 
watchdogs of sorts, using criticism to hold the media accountable. Borden and Tew argue 
that Stewart and Stephen Colbert of ​The Colbert Report​ engage in a “performance of 
journalism” in which they “parody the news while simultaneously presenting and 
criticizing it,” but add that the two hosts should not be considered journalists because 
they are not required to adhere to the same rules regarding objectivity (Borden & Tew 
306). Rather, they label the two as “media critics” who “seem to occupy a place on the 
line between internal and external criticism” (309). Painter and Hodges, examining ​The 
Daily Show​, concur with this assessment of Stewart as a media critic tied closely to the 
Fourth Estate (Painter & Hodges 272). They argue that “Stewart and his Daily Show 
cohorts attempt to hold traditional broadcast media accountable to the public in four 
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ways:” pointing out falsehoods, pointing out inconsistencies, pointing out when 
inconsequential news is blown out of proportion, and by critiquing such practices 
common among news organizations as naming recurring segments (Painter & Hodges 
268-271). According to Borden, Tew, Painter, and Hodges, Stewart and Colbert engage 
in a process of metacriticism where their role is to hold the American news media 
accountable by correcting their failings. 
Other scholars have identified several more rhetorical tools Stewart and Colbert 
have used in their criticisms, expanding on the list originally outlined by Painter and 
Hodges. Howell investigates Stewart and Colbert as epideictic rhetors who use 
blame-based rhetoric to “position their audience to both validate their definitions of civic 
virtues and praise itself for possessing those virtues” (Howell 7). In functioning as such, 
Howell posits that “Stewart and Colbert meet a civic need,” offering “well-argued and 
entertaining assessments of civic virtue and vice” and modeling “how America might 
construct a critical, civic discourse in which individual citizens can take an active part” 
(Howell 16). Waisanen shares Howell’s view on Stewart and Colbert’s potential to 
change public discourse, asserting that the two hosts use three strategies–parodic 
polyglossia, satirical specificity, and contextual clash–to “refashion public discourse” 
(Waisanen 122). By parodically using multiple voices to embody multiple positions, 
using satire to critically analyze the words and actions of various political figures, and 
using apolitical comparisons to explain political concepts, Waisanen argues that Stewart 
and Colbert “teach us that a public sphere is healthy to the extent that participants can 
engage in vigorous debate and reflective advocacy, take the perspectives of others, and 
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make critiques in a playful rather than combative manner” (135). According to Howell 
and Waisanen, Stewart and Colbert use rhetorical genres and strategies as a means of 
forging new possibilities for civic discourse.  
While many scholars see comedy news anchors as performers of criticism rather 
than journalism, others argue that the two are more closely related. Faina writes that “Jon 
Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s impact on the mass mediated public sphere can benefit 
from characterizing them as public journalists,” arguing that the type of criticism they 
practice draws them closer to the traditions of public journalism than many scholars think 
(Faina 544). Baym concurs with this assessment. Framing the emergence of ​The Daily 
Show​ and ​The Colbert Report​ against the backdrop of an American news media 
increasingly struggling to hold its constituency’s trust, he argues that ​TDS​ offers a new 
form of political journalism combining elements from both traditional network news and 
entertainment and comedy genres (Baym 2010, 104). In combining these two forms, 
Baym asserts that Stewart and Colbert “reinvigorate the practice of reasoned discourse, 
both demanding and enacting the ideals of deliberative democracy” (Baym 2010, 173). 
For Faina and Baym, Stewart and Colbert’s comedic media criticism does not preclude 
them from being journalists, but rather constitutes some form of journalism in and of 
itself.  
The discussion about where these shows fall on the spectrum between information 
and entertainment opens avenues of inquiry for political scientists seeking to determine 
how effective alternative news sources can be in shaping audience perceptions of 
American politics. Cao (2010) analyzes two Pew Research Center polls, one from 2002 
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and another from 2004, which surveyed respondents on the relationship between 
viewership of ​The Daily Show​ and attentiveness to the War in Afghanistan and the 2004 
presidential election, respectively, finding that politically inattentive viewers of the show 
(about 20% of its viewership) became more attentive to those issues following ​Daily 
Show​ coverage (Cao 2010, 38-40). Feldman and Young find that viewers of late-night 
comedy shows such as ​TDS​ became more news attentive over the course of the 2004 
presidential primary than those who did not watch late-night comedy, suggesting that 
such shows can function as a gateway to traditional news (Feldman & Young 416). Cao 
(2008) finds that this correlation intensifies among younger and more educated viewers, a 
conclusion likewise reached by Hollander (Cao 2008, 58; Hollander 411). Furthermore, 
Fox, Koloen, and Sahin find that ​The Daily Show​ and traditional news sources were 
equally substantive in their coverage of the 2004 Presidential election (Fox et al. 222). 
These studies suggest that ​The Daily Show​ and political late-night comedy shows like it 
share a capacity to share information and affect political attentiveness in a manner similar 
to their more traditional counterparts.  
Other scholars have examined the way that Stewart’s criticism affects the way 
viewers of his show view political candidates. Using a sample of 732 college students, 
Baumgartner and Morris found that students shown clips from ​The Daily Show​ focusing 
on 2004 presidential candidates John Kerry and George W. Bush had a more negative 
view of the two candidates than a group of their counterparts, who were shown clips from 
CBS Evening News​ of the same subject and length (Baumgartner & Morris 349). 
Furthermore, they found that those who viewed to ​The Daily Show​ were “significantly 
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less likely to agree” with the statement “I have faith in the U.S. electoral system” than 
their mainstream news-viewing counterparts (Baumgartner & Morris 352). Baumgartner 
and Morris’ study is crucial because it indicates that ​The Daily Show​ is successful not 
only in its humor, but also in its ability to influence audience perceptions through the use 
of that humor.  
Considering this capacity of late-night comedy shows to influence perception, it 
comes as no surprise that scholars have also paid attention to how traditional news outlets 
view the programs which lampoon them. Berkowitz and Gutsche write on a ​New York 
Times​ article comparing Stewart to Edward R. Murrow following the former’s advocacy 
for the 2010 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, using that comparison to argue that 
“collective memory can serve as a way of drawing and redrawing journalistic lines 
through the authority that memory brings” (Berkowitz & Gutsche 653). “Most simply,” 
they assert, “the initial endorsement became a direct form of boundary adjustment to 
recapture ownership of a lost journalistic opportunity” (Berkowitz & Gutsche 653). 
Carlson and Peifer also studied media reactions to Stewart’s support for the 9/11 Health 
and Compensation Act, as well as his role in organizing the March to Restore Sanity 
and/or Fear earlier that year, arguing that news media organizations engaged in a form of 
“boundary maintenance” by criticizing Stewart’s open advocacy for certain political 
positions and use of humor in discussing political issues (Carlson & Peifer 346). In 
questioning whether Stewart was crossing a boundary, becoming too serious and 
involved in the public sphere, Carlson and Peifer assert that mainstream news media 
outlets were claiming ownership of those roles within American civic discourse (345). 
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These studies suggest that, in addition to informing and changing audience perception, 
shows like ​The Daily Show​ have caused mainstream news outlets to reconsider and 
re-draw boundaries around what constitutes journalism. 
The civically-minded criticisms offered by figures like Stewart and Colbert 
observed by scholars also tie those figures to another role in society: that of the public 
intellectual. According to Etzioni, public intellectuals “opine on a wide array of issues, 
are generalists rather than specialists, concern themselves with matters of interest to the 
public at large, and do not keep their views to themselves” (Etzioni 1). She further asserts 
that public intellectuals “must engage in moral deliberations because all major public and 
social policies that they routinely criticize have important moral dimensions” (Etzioni 3). 
Brouwer and Squires offer a concurrent explanation, defining public intellectuals as 
“well-traveled and broadly educated [individuals] of letters who [can] speak on a myriad 
of topics and [are] listened to by important sectors of the public and, in the case of some 
who [gain] access to political powerbrokers, public policy” (Brouwer & Squires 204). 
They should be able to speak on a wide range of “serious or grand issues… with exquisite 
depth of knowledge” (Brouwer & Squires 204). Public intellectuals thus face two 
concerns: becoming too academic and losing their public audience, and becoming too 
public, thereby losing their ability to speak with authority on a wide range of issues 
(Etzioni 11). Public intellectuals, then, can be most effectively defined as individuals who 
write on important issues and cater this work to a larger audience.  
While scholars of public intellectualism generally agree on this basic definition, 
they are less united on the settings in which public intellectualism occurs. Etzioni argues 
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it is useful to divide public intellectuals into two groups: the bohemian intellectual, a 
freestanding writer who often takes up residence in a city; and the academic intellectual, 
generally to be found in the university (Etzioni 10). Jacoby argues, however, that 
emphasis has increasingly shifted to the academic intellectual. Noting that the American 
university boom resulted in a massive increase in the number of college teachers (from 
50,000 in 1920 to 500,000 in 1970), Jacoby posits that “the newly opened and enlarged 
colleges allowed, if not compelled, intellectuals to desert a precarious existence for stable 
careers,” thus recasting both the lives of intellectuals and intellectual life (Jacoby 14-15). 
Consequently, he argues, academic journals have become the primary site of public 
intellectual writing.  
Jacoby’s conception of the public intellectual’s migration from the city to the 
academy and of their current role within civic discourse puts the public intellectual in a 
state of decline. He believes that as the academic intellectual continues to overtake the 
bohemian, the work of the public intellectual is consumed by an increasingly smaller and 
academic audience. Posner agrees, asserting that “today… the typical public intellectual 
is a safe specialist, which is not the type of person well suited to play the public 
intellectual’s most distinctive… role, that of critical commentator addressing a 
nonspecialist audience on matters of broad public concern” (Posner 5). For these 
theorists, the public intellectual is somewhat of an endangered species, receding into the 
academy and becoming increasingly esoteric.  
Some theorists, however, dispute this explanation. Etzioni challenges the 
argument that increased association with the academy removes public intellectuals from 
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their nonspecialist audience by pointing out that some of the most prominent intellectuals 
of our time, such as Noam Chomsky, Cornel West, and Howard Zinn, are academics 
(Etzioni 10-11). Academic public intellectuals, she argues, “seem to be able to serve as 
independent critics at least as well” as their free-standing counterparts (Etzioni 11). 
Faflak and Haslem take their disagreement further, refuting the notion that the public 
intellectual can be separated from the public at all. They argue instead that “the 
intellectual ​is​ part of the public and the public ​is ​intellectual, both in its structural 
formation as a sphere of (inter)action and in its constituent, individual parts. If the public 
sphere is an intrinsic part of intellectual life, culture becomes the space that connects the 
two” (Faflak & Haslem 8). Even as the number of bohemian intellectuals decline while 
the number of academic intellectuals rise, these theorists argue that the public intellectual 
remains an important part of civic discourse and remain vital to the public.  
The majority of academic work on public intellectuals, however, relies on 
definitions similar to those outlined above. Some theorists argue that, given the changes 
American civic discourse has undergone as a result of the evolution of our media 
landscape, the definition of what constitutes a public intellectual ought to be broadened. 
Some theorists argue that modern public intellectual comes from a somewhat unlikely 
source: the 11 PM slot on Comedy Central. MacMullan argues that Jon Stewart ought to 
be considered a public intellectual because “behind all the jokes, both witty and 
sophomoric, is an unalloyed faith in the power of the American political project to 
improve people’s lives” (MacMullan 66). In making his criticisms–which touch on a 
wide variety of issues–Stewart satisfies a desire felt by Americans for critical 
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commentary; he strives to “explain why we should be skeptical about our government, 
which often seems dangerously disconnected from reality” (MacMullan 63). Parsi agrees 
with MacMullan, going further to posit that Stewart is “our greatest public intellectual” 
(Parsi 3). Parsi references two examples, a report on a clean campaign being run in 
Connecticut and Sarah Palin’s invention of the term “death panels,” where Stewart used 
news stories and brought on guests to inform his audience on the nature of altruism and 
the bioethics of health care, respectively (Parsi 5). While Stewart is in no uncertain terms 
not an academic, these theorists argue that he remains a public intellectual because he 
uses his platform to speak to a nonspecialist audience on a wide variety of issues.  
This view opens new avenues of examination of the state of civic discourse in this 
country. Whether or not a figure like Stewart, Colbert, or John Oliver can be described as 
a public intellectual is at least somewhat disputable, but it is far less disputable that, on 
their respective shows, the three perform some form of public intellect, as all three use 
their programs to speak to nonspecialist audiences about important issues. The format of 
Last Week Tonight​ is different from its predecessors, allowing Oliver to devote 
meaningful time each week to discuss a different issue of national import with his 
audience. Thus, Oliver performs public intellect on a near-weekly basis. The aim of this 
study is to fill a gap in existing research, using Oliver’s informative “main story” 
segments on ​Last Week Tonight​ as an artifact to help understand the performance of 
public intellect by personalities on the liberal side of the American news media.  
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Burkean Frames: A Theoretical Foundation 
This research grounds itself in the writings of Kenneth Burke. Specifically, his 
writings on frames of acceptance and rejection are of particular interest. Burke asserts 
that “one constructs [their] notion of the universe or history, and shapes attitudes in 
keeping” (Burke 3). Based on these attitudes, one “singles out certain functions or 
relationships as either friendly or unfriendly,” preparing to welcome them if they are 
deemed friendly, or weighing “objective resistances against [their] own resources, to 
decide how far [they] can effectively go in combating them” (Burke 3-4). Taking this into 
consideration, he argues that “we must name the friendly or unfriendly functions and 
relationships in such a way that we are able to do something about them,” adding that “in 
naming them, we form our characters, since the names embody attitudes; and implicit in 
the attitudes there are the cues for behavior” (Burke 4).  
It is these names, and these attitudes, that form the basis of Burkean frames. 
Arguing that “all symbolic structures are designed to produce… acceptance in one form 
or another,” Burke states that these structures “shape our relations with our fellows,” 
preparing us “​for​ some functions and ​against​ others, ​for​ or ​against​ the persons 
representing these functions” (Burke 4, his emphasis). However, Burke goes further than 
this, arguing that the same names and attitudes suggest “​how​ you shall be for or against” 
(Burke 4, his emphasis). Thus, Burke defines frames of acceptance as “the more or less 
organized system of meanings by which a thinking [person] gauges the historical 
situation and adopts a role with relation to it” (Burke 5).  
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Burke illustrates this by providing an example in the form of the epic frame. In 
referring to the epic, Burke recalls the form of the epic poems of Ancient Greece, ones 
which arose “under primitive, non-commercial, conditions” (Burke 34). Burke considers 
this origin, remarking on the “​deliberately​ archaic” quality of the Homeric poems, and 
argues that the purpose of this form is identification with commonly held values: 
The epic is designed, then, under primitive conditions, to make men “at 
home in” those conditions. It “accepts” the rigors of war (the basis of the 
tribe’s success) by magnifying the role of the warlike hero. Such 
magnification serves two purposes: it lends dignity to the necessities of 
existence, “advertising” courage and individual sacrifice for group 
advantage–and it enables the human man to share the worth of the hero by 
the process of “identification.” (Burke 35-36) 
A story of war, told through the epic frame, justifies the warrior in the eyes of the 
audience, because it advertises the virtue of doing what is necessary for the tribe’s 
success. The epic was also important in that its hero was generally humanized, having 
flaws and strengths just as any human would (Burke 36). Thus, identification with the 
epic hero necessarily “the invitation to seek the flaw in oneself,” promoting an “attitude 
of resignation” to both the flawed nature of humans and to the necessity of sacrifice 
(Burke 37). Through this example, Burke illustrates that people use frames in order to 
contextualize themselves within history and within their environments; in this case, the 
epic frame identifies practices like sacrifice and war as virtuous to make the necessity of 
those practices more palatable.  
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For Burke, frames are lenses which influence the way we approach and consider 
our history, but also discursive forms used in attempt to influence the attitudes of others, 
which Burke argues is important because an attitude constitutes an “incipient program of 
action” (Burke 20). Crucially, Burke argues that humans use frames as a means by which 
they adopt attitudes towards the symbols of authority  within their society (Burke 4). He 4
divides these frames into two principal categories: frames of acceptance, among which 
Burke identifies the tragic and comic frames, prepare people to accept symbols of 
authority (Burke 19), while frames of rejection, which include the plaint or elegy frame, 
the satiric frame, and the burlesque frame, prepare people to reject them (Burke 21).  
The tragic and comic frames are united by a few important characteristics. Firstly, 
both frames are built around the presence of the hero. In the case of the comic frame, the 
hero is an intelligent figure attempting to set straight the fools standing opposite to them; 
in the tragic frame, the hero stands opposed to villains committed to opposing attitudes 
(Burke 41). Furthermore, the epic, comic, and tragic frames are united in that within 
them, “the element of ​acceptance​ is uppermost” (Burke 43). Ultimately, both the tragic 
and the comic frames of acceptance undergird themselves in accepting existing attitudes 
and symbols of authority.  
In the tragic frame, events occur more or less without any means of preventing 
them from doing so. The tragic frame is one where divine, superhuman, or inhuman 
“dispositions are concerned with human destinies” (Burke 38). Histories in the tragic 
4 ​Burke notes symbols of authority is a term “designed for pointing-in-the-direction-of-something rather 
than for clear demarcation of that-in-the-direction-of-which-we-would-point” (Burke 329). It is thus a 
catch-all term Burke uses to refer to “rulers, courts, parliaments. Laws, educators, constabulary, and the 
moral slogans linked with such” (Burke 329).  
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frame are considered “complex trials by jury… we get in one piece the offence, the 
sentence, and the expiation” (Burke 38). This view is derived from a forensic approach 
imposing “​scientific​ concepts of causality upon earlier patterns of magic and religion,” 
(Burke 38). Events in the tragic frame are “made to grow out of one another in keeping 
with the logic of scientific cogency, the Q.E.D. of Euclid and the political oration” 
(Burke 38-39). Discourse in the tragic frame accepts events as they happen, approaches 
those events with an attitude of resignation; a person who falls, breaks their leg, and 
simply complains aloud at having done so considers that event through a tragic frame.  
Because tragedy frequently “deals in crime,” so too does the tragic frame (Burke 
39). Thus, attitudes in the tragic frame necessitate the existence of a criminal, as well as 
the existence of an authority by whom the criminal will eventually be brought to justice 
(Burke 39). However, the tragic frame deals “​sympathetically​ with crime;” in considering 
events through the tragic frame, “we are made to feel that [the criminal’s] offence is our 
offence, and at the same time the offence is dignified by nobility of style” (Burke 39). We 
sympathize with the villains because their crimes are ultimately a result of “the basic sin” 
– pride. We view the crimes of Brutus and Cassius, “offenders against ‘ambitious’ 
Caesar,” sympathetically; so too do we have sympathy for MacBeth, as the thoughts of 
regicide were planted in his head by witches (Burke 40). In addition to the criminals (in 
these cases Brutus and Cassius and MacBeth), we also have villains; both in Caesar’s 
pride, and in the witches, for awakening MacBeth’s pride. These villains, the agents who 
bring about the offence, are a necessary part of the tragic frame.  
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However, the necessitated presence of a villain makes changing attitudes through 
discourse difficult. To “call a man a villain,” Burke says, brings a choice of either 
attacking further or cringing (Burke 4). In contrast, to call him mistaken is to “invite 
yourself to attempt setting him right” (Burke 4). This is the crucial difference between the 
tragic frame and the comic frame. Rather than understanding stories from a perspective of 
a virtuous hero and an evil villain, the heroes and villains in the comic frame are 
intelligent and mistaken or tricked, respectively (Burke 4-5).  
Burke argues that “the progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than 
in picturing people not as ​vicious​, but as ​mistaken​” (Burke 41). Unlike the tragic frame, 
wherein events “are made to grow out of one another in keeping with the logic of 
scientific cogency,” events in the comic frame can be changed because the ideas or 
people the frame is aligned against are not evil, but mistaken. By changing the villain’s 
mind, the rhetor in the comic frame uses discourse to create change in their society.  
The comic frame thus also differs from the tragic frame in its scope. Whereas the 
tragic frame deals with “the ​cosmic man​,” framing stories such that the motivating forces 
are either “superhuman” or “in-human,” The comic frame deals with “​man in society​,” 
and is as a result “essentially ​humane​, leading in periods of comparative stability to the 
comedy of manners, the dramatization of quirks and foibles” (Burke 42, his emphasis). 
Thus, the comic frame “should enable people ​to be observers of themselves, while acting​. 
Its ultimate would not be ​passiveness​, but ​maximum consciousness​” (Burke 171, his 
emphasis). The comic frame is better suited for changing attitudes, as it is firmly 
grounded in the humane, allowing people to change attitudes within themselves or others; 
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a person who falls, breaks their leg, and thanks God they didn’t break their neck is 
viewing the event from a comic frame.  
In discussing comic frames, Burke makes the important distinction between 
comedy and humor. Whereas the comedy is heroic, with an informed hero working to 
change the attitudes of mistaken foes, humor is “the opposite of the heroic” (Burke 43). 
Burke argues that “the heroic promotes acceptance by ​magnification​,” elevating the hero 
so that the audience may identify with them, humor “takes up the slack between the 
momentousness of the situation and the feebleness of those in the situation by ​dwarfing 
the situation​. It converts downwards, as the heroic converts upwards” (Burke 43). 
Because it tends to gauge the situation falsely, humor “does not make for so completely 
well-rounded a frame of acceptance as comedy” (Burke 43). Burke describes the frame of 
humor as a “customary method of self-protection” underlying an “attitude of ‘happy 
stupidity’ whereby the gravity of life simply fails to register” (Burke 43). The humor 
frame is thus unideal in working to create change because it falsely guages the situation 
to begin with.  
Just as there are frames of acceptance, so too are their frames of rejection. Rather 
than seeing rejection as an opposite to acceptance, he sees it as a “byproduct” of it, 
remarking that the main distinction between the two “involves primarily a matter of 
emphasis” (Burke 21). A crucial factor, then, is the subject’s attitude towards the symbols 
of authority around them. “If the king is well thought of in most quarters,” Burke argues, 
“the [person] who would build [their] frame to accept the necessity of deposing the king 
is almost necessarily… shunted into a negative emphasis” (Burke 22). In making the 
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argument for communism in the Communist Manifesto, it would be unwise for Marx to 
frame capitalism as a well-intentioned-but-flawed system; to be effective, it must be a 
“specter that haunts” (Burke 22). Burke argues that, in this approach, frames of rejection 
are defined by partiality, and the lack of a complete understanding of the situation (Burke 
22).  
The first frame of rejection Burke outlines is the elegiac frame. Noting that “once 
a man has perfected a technique of complaint, he is more at home with sorrow than he 
would be without it,” he quotes Augustine, arguing that the elegiac frame allows a person 
to “avenge oneself by weeping” (Burke 44). The elegiac frame allows people to accept 
life, even while “symbolizing its rejection” through constant complaint (44). Discourse in 
the elegiac frame is little more than a list of complaints about the state of things, without 
any proposal for how the situation might be altered. A person who sees the world through 
an elegiac frame offers many complaints, but has no desire to remedy them. Thus, Burke 
argues that the frame is similar to humor in that it “does not properly gauge the situation: 
when under its spell, one does not tend to size up [their] own resources accurately” 
(Burke 44).  
The satiric frame is somewhat less negative than its elegiac counterpart. The 
satirist, Burke argues, “attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations that are really 
within themselves” (Burke 49). In explaining this further, Burke uses an example of two 
politicians who share a secret vice. During a debate, one criticizes the other’s political 
stances, drawing on imagery of their shared vice. In doing so, he both excoriates his 
opponent and “gratifies and punishes the vice within himself;” thus, he is “whipped with 
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his own lash” (Burke 49). To the audience of such a debate, this may be seen as one 
politician attacking another’s externalities, when in reality the politician is attacking his 
own internalities onto his opponent. Discourse in the satirical frame, then, is 
fundamentally based on scapegoating; one person identifies a flaw within themselves, 
and then rejects it by attacking another for having the same flaw. Thus, though the satirist 
attacks another, that which they wish to attack is within themselves. 
DuBois disagrees with Burke’s explanation of the satire frame. He argues that, 
rather than focusing on attacking in others “the weaknesses and temptations that are 
really within” oneself, discourse in the satiric frame “criticizes by incongruities between 
an ideal or real, accepted mode of behavior and a real, rejected mode of behavior” 
(DuBois 353). While DuBois admits that “as satire grows cosmic in scope and laughs at 
or with all mankind,... it may appear to make the author lash at [their] own vices or 
mortality,” he counters that, by pointing out incongruities between accepted and rejected 
modes, the satiric frame necessarily lashes “out” rather than “in” (DuBois 353-354). 
DuBois thus argues that the satire frame does not attack an inner weakness, but instead 
points out incongruities between accepted and rejected modes of behavior.  
The burlesque frame does not concern itself with such complexities. Rather than 
attacking in others what is really in oneself or pointing out incongruities between ideals 
and behavior, the burlesque frame really does constitute an attack on externalities, and is 
thus enjoyable as an “occasional dish,” but not as a full discursive diet (Burke 54). The 
rhetor in the burlesque frame “makes no attempt to get inside the psyche of [their] 
victim;” the objective here is not to persuade them, but to destroy them, to demonize 
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them, and to “convert every ‘perhaps’ into a ‘positively’” by selecting the externals of 
behavior and driving them to a “‘logical conclusion’ that becomes their ‘reduction to 
absurdity’” (Burke 54-55). Thus, the burlesque frame also “does not contain a 
well-rounded frame within itself,” and can be used to the ends of wisdom only insofar as 
as “we ourselves provide ways of making allowances for it” (Burke 55). It can be used 
only to lower others in comparison to oneself, and thus rejects important parts of 
discourse in favor of serving that purpose.  
It is rare to find a rhetorical situation in which only one frame is at work. Burke 
argues that “none of these poetic categories can be isolated in its chemical purity;” rather, 
frames “overlap upon one another, involving the qualitative matter of emphasis” (Burke 
57). Adding that sharp differentiation between acceptance and rejection is impossible (the 
acceptance of A necessitates the rejection of non-A), Burke asserts that “epic, tragedy, 
and comedy gravitate towards the positive side, while elegy, satire, and burlesque stress 
the negative” (Burke 57). This distinction suggests the existence of two transition frames: 
a grotesque frame built around mysticism, and a didactic frame built around propaganda 
(Burke 57). Both these frames arise when there are discrepancies in the frames being 
used within society.  
The grotesque frame can be found where an objective set of values cannot be 
agreed upon. Burke argues that “mysticism as a collective moment belongs to periods 
marked by great confusion of the cultural frame, requiring a radical shift in people’s 
allegiance to symbols of authority” (Burke 57-58). The grotesque frame, then, is a “cult 
of incongruity” much like humor, except that the grotesque does not provoke laughter 
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(Burke 58). The grotesque comes to the fore when “confusion in the forensic pattern 
gives more prominence to the subjective elements of imagery than to the objective, or 
public, elements” (Burke 60). Thus, the world within the grotesque frame is a world in 
which multiple values are promoted, and thus in which objective truth is difficult, or even 
impossible, to determine.  
In the chaotic situations where a grotesque frame is at work, some symbol of 
authority, such as a regime, may propagate the attitudes of their frame through 
propaganda, thus creating a didactic frame. The didactic frame is characterized less by 
conflicting information and more by attempts at obfuscating one truth and substituting 
another. The didactic frame seeks to change attitudes “by coaching the imagination in 
obedience to critical postulates” (Burke 75). Actors within a didactic frame attempt “to 
avoid the confusions of synthesis by a schematic decision to label certain people ‘friends’ 
or ‘enemies’” (Burke 79). This procedure consequently leads “naturally to 
oversimplifications of character and history that can, by the opposition, be discounted as 
sentimentality” (Burke 79). This attempt to reshape widely-held attitudes requires the 
muddying of discourse to the point where the difference between fact and fiction 
becomes unclear. Thus, a grotesque frame becomes didactic when one part of society 
engages in this muddying in attempt to convert others to holding their attitudes.  
Burke’s conceptions of frames are an important tool in understanding discourse in 
society. They allow academics to understand how certain people and groups define 
themselves in relation to other people and groups, and in relation to dominant symbols of 
authority. While both frames of acceptance necessarily accept symbols of authority, the 
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comic frame gives its hero an opportunity to correct their mistaken villains, thus leaving 
the door open for them to change the way the symbols of authority around them function 
without rejecting their legitimacy. In contrast, frames of rejection necessarily reject those 
symbols of authority. The reform to an existing system which can be achieved through 
the comic frame is insufficient in situations of rejection; rejectors must break symbols of 
authority to allow new ones to take their place.  
Immediately following their publication, Burke’s arguments on acceptance and 
rejection received largely positive attention from other academics. DuBois largely agrees 
with Burke, but notes a few important disagreements. Generally, he finds Burke’s 
definitions of the terms Burke uses in differentiating between types of frames to be 
somewhat incomplete; he uses the genre of the mock-epic as evidence that Burke’s 
positioning of the humor as an opposite of the heroic is mistaken (DuBois 352) and 
argues that the elegy and the plaint “are not synonymous,” but rather that the latter is part 
of the former (DuBois 354). DuBois ultimately notes that, “though one may add to or 
detract from Burke’s discussion of terms,” the notion of frames of acceptance and 
rejection–and with it the notion that the two are connotative–is “a useful addition to the 
vocabulary of criticism,” and applauds Burke for his position that criticism ought to be 
comic (DuBois 355-356). Schlauch takes a similar position, finding a compelling, if 
somewhat incomplete argument within a book presenting “both charm and challenge” 
(Schlauch 128). While Schlauch agrees with Burke’s argument that acceptance and 
rejection are inherently related in that the acceptance of A necessitates the rejection of 
non-A, she argues that “forms of thought are given a position of primary importance in 
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Burke's scheme of history, despite other passages which seem to disclaim this” (Schlauch 
130). As a consequence of this, she argues that Burke “fails to realize the importance” of 
his admission (Schlauch 130). Though both reviewers of Burke’s frames had their 
criticisms, both DuBois and Schlauch find the theory to be interesting and compelling. 
Burkean frames are somewhat underused in the analysis of public discourse, but 
the body of academic work that has been done finds the comic frame a useful tool in 
enacting societal change. Murphy examines the comic frame in the rhetoric of John F. 
Kennedy and Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, arguing that both used the 
comic frame in articulating “the philosophical groundwork for broadening the terms of 
the American covenant and opening the process to previously excluded people” (Murphy 
267). By portraying Nixon as “a comic clown,” Kennedy’s rhetoric served “to redeem the 
country of the mistake of prejudice and invigorate the principles of freedom, justice, and 
democracy enshrined in the American covenant” (Murphy 271). In this analysis, Murphy 
makes the argument that the study of presidential discourse is insightful not only in 
understanding a candidate’s victory, but in understanding shifts in in American culture at 
large. In this example, Murphy demonstrates the role of the comic frame in shifting 
public attitudes.  
Carlson and Powell also confirm Burke’s argument of the comic frame as an 
agent of change by charting its use by civil rights leaders advocating for reform. Carlson 
argues that Mahatma Gandhi’s independence movement in India was “rhetorically 
significant because his strategy and tactics create a form of action which reflects a ‘comic 
frame’” rather than the tragic one through which revolutionary movements are often 
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viewed (Carlson 1986 447). She asserts that a tragic view of revolution justifies the use of 
violence on the grounds that no social change would be possible without it, whereas the 
end of a movement from the comic perspective is “to free society by creating a 
consciousness of the system as a system, revealing its inherent weaknesses, and preparing 
an aware populace to deal with them” (Carlson 1986 447). Carlson specifically identifies 
the strategy of nonviolent resistance as an example of this, arguing the tactic “creates a 
drama which demonstrates an unjust situation on so large a scale that the community has 
no choice but to confront it” (Carlson 1986 450). Powell, writing on the efforts of The 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, argues that the group 
used four strategies–spirituality, identification, juxtaposition, and repudiation–to build a 
comic discourse that “did not seek to destroy the existing social order, but recognized the 
error which had developed within the social system, and sought to correct it” (Powell 86)5
. Agreeing with Burke’s argument that the comic frame pushes people towards maximum 
consciousness, Powell contends that the comic frame employed by ASWPL succeeded by 
“prodding the consciousness, or change from within the individual, instead of forcing 
change through victimage” (Powell 96). Carlson and Powell illuminate the comic frame 
as an ideal perspective from which to issue a nonviolent call for reform to a system 
because it accepts the status quo while also making the case for reform.  
The comic frame, however, is only useful insofar as it does not threaten the status 
quo to too great an extent. Thus, scholars have noted that, as movements become more 
radical, the frame they use tends to shift. Appel (1997) identifies a shift in the rhetoric 
5 As Powell notes, the ASWPL “maintained itself as a segregationist group,” situating itself firmly within 
the same power structures it sought, if only in part, to destroy (Powell 92).  
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used by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., arguing that King “moved from a mostly comic 
style, from 1955-1966, to a mostly tragic style, in 1967-1968” (Appel 1997 376). He 
observes that King’s early speeches “did not attack the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or 
America’s capitalist economy,” and contends that these speeches “sought innovation, not 
revolution, in their nation’s way of life” (Appel 1997 385). In contrast, Appel argues, 
King’s later work discussed problems such as poverty, the need for housing reform, a 
substandard education system, and the Vietnam War (Appel 1997 385). These problems 
were “markedly more onerous and criminal,” and the blame for them was “more clearly 
localized in the leaders of the United States of America” (Appel 1997 396). According to 
Appel, King’s rhetoric in the last year of his life shifted to a tragic frame, positioning 
American symbols of authority in a more villainous light to advocate the need for a more 
radical change.  
Scholarly attention also reveals that, in advocating for radical change, a rhetor 
might move not only from one frame of acceptance to another, but from a frame of 
acceptance to one of rejection. Carlson analyzes the writings of early women humorists 
between 1820 and 1880, contending that these writings “became less and less truly 
comic, eventually sliding into satire, and finally into burlesque” (Carlson 1988 311). 
Carlson argues that, whereas early writings from that period accepted “the prevailing 
notion of social hierarchy while attempting to correct its failings,” the later writings 
acknowledged a need for a more meaningful shift away from that prevailing notion 
(Carlson 1988 312). Thus, she finds that the rhetoric of women humorists advocating a 
more meaningful change to the system shifted over time to a burlesque frame through 
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which the prevailing social hierarchy could be reduced to absurdity. In these pieces, 
Carlson and Appel argue that the comic frame is a useful form of discourse in advocating 
for change only insofar as that change does not upset prevailing notions of social 
hierarchy, and note that when the need for more radical change arises, the rhetor must 
switch from the comic frame either to a tragic frame of acceptance or a burlesque frame 
of rejection.  
Other scholars have noted that some civil rights leaders spoke through multiple 
frames at the same time. Striking a contrast with the rhetoric of Dr. King, Selby examines 
the rhetoric of Ralph David Abernathy, another prominent leader in the Civil Rights 
movement and a close friend of King’s, and argues that Abernathy “consistently 
portrayed Whites from the perspective of burlesque humor, a perspective that invited a 
reaction to them not of fear or pity, but of scoffing laughter” (Selby 135). Abernathy’s 
rhetoric consistently portrayed “Whites in general and White opponents of racial justice 
in particular as bumbling, ridiculous, and impotent” (Selby 142). Selby asserts that, 
through this portrayal, Abernathy “declared that Whites were ultimately powerless either 
to grant or to stand in the way of Blacks' demands for justice” and cultivated a discourse 
through which Blacks could express their anger nonviolently (Selby 142-143). Thus, in 
this example, the burlesque frame is used as a complement to more comic frames by 
creating a discourse through which people could express frustration while also portraying 
opponents as unable to stand against them.  
Appel (1996) concurs with this assessment. he discusses the rhetoric of William 
F. Buckley, Jr., a prominent leader in the conservative movement during the middle of 
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the 20th century and argues that, through rhetorical strategies including black-and-white 
schematization of political problems, a heartless caricature of bumbling opponents, and 
the rejection and limited banishment of the retrograde opponents, Buckley’s rhetoric 
positions the burlesque frame as a mediator between tragedy and comedy which allowed 
both author and audience to “adopt a frame of acceptance and a frame of rejection at the 
same time” (Appel 1996 281). Appel’s work expands upon and amends Burke’s original 
description of the burlesque frame by positioning the frame as one used to both accept 
and reject authority, rather than solely to reject it.  
Because the burlesque frame can be used to simultaneously accept and reject, it 
makes itself a useful tool in redefining group boundaries. Analyzing letters written to the 
editors of various Arizona newspapers during the short-lived gubernatorial career of Evan 
Mecham, Buerkle, Mayer, and Olson found that letters written in support of Mecham 
positioned him as a tragic “champion of social conservative values… and a righteous 
martyr at the hands of the liberals” (Buerkle et. al 196). In contrast, they argue that the 
drive for a recall election provided more moderate conservatives in the state an 
opportunity to “redefine Arizona conservatism by rejecting” the more extreme positions 
Mecham championed (Buerkle et. al 199). Thus, the burlesque frame was useful in this 
case because it allowed for rejection “that would not require Republicans to completely 
jettison conservative ideology, just the portion that they found offensive” (Buerkle et. al 
199). In rejecting the more radical wing of the Arizona conservative movement, 
moderates also engaged in a process of accepting and affirming their conception of 
conservatism.  
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Other scholars have explored how the burlesque frame can be used to justify 
atrocities. Hubbard uses “the underutilized Burkean concepts of the burlesque frame and 
entelechy” as a means of understanding the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “the 
central event in our nuclear memory” (Hubbard 353). Drawing from the writings of 
President Harry Truman, the norms and morals of war, and popular indicators, Hubbard 
argues that the decision to bomb the two cities was a consequence of a pervasive 
burlesque frame which “distorts ethics, creates caricatures of the enemy, and prevents 
explorations of more rational alternatives” (Hubbard 356). In Hubbard’s view, the 
consideration of this frame presents a “missing context” for revisionist re-readings of the 
event, which ignored the role of frames (Hubbard 354). In this example, the use of the 
burlesque frame to create caricatures of the enemy served to make the perceived wartime 
necessity of dropping an atomic bomb more acceptable; thus, the burlesque frame was 
used in this case to justify that tragic conclusion. This example is also significant in that it 
demonstrates the situational utility of frames; when fighting a war, the application of a 
burlesque frame to the enemy is useful because it makes the acts that seem tragically 
necessary easier to justify. 
Frames have also played an important role in academic discussions surrounding 
artifacts of American comedy . In her analysis of political cartoons that criticized former 6
Interior Secretary James Watt, Bostdorff argues that the burlesque is “the most 
appropriate framework for understanding the rhetorical attitude of political cartoons” 
6 It is crucial here to draw a distinction between comedy and the comic frame. In referring to “artifacts of 
American comedy,” I mean artifacts designed to entertain, and specifically to make audience members 
laugh. As we shall see, these artifacts frequently but do not necessarily make their critique in the comic 
frame.  
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because audience members “typically approach such artifacts with an aggressive attitude 
of their own” and because the burlesque frame is most compatible with the simplistic 
form of editorial cartoons (Bostdorff 46). Bostdorff finds that the burlesque criticism 
carried out in political cartoons about Watt was guided by four tropes, being metaphor, 
irony, synecdoche, and metonymy (Bostdorff 48). In this example, Bostdorff 
demonstrates that the burlesque frame remains useful in comedy as a means of reducing 
the stature of villains.  
Other scholars have turned their attention to the genre of satire , specifically with 7
regard to alternative news sources. Waisanen argues that Jon Stewart and Stephen 
Colbert “are comic rhetorical critics, who both make important contributions to public 
discourse and civil society” (Waisanen 119). He contends that both rhetors use the 
rhetorical strategies of contextual clash, parodic polyglossia, satirical specificity, which 
he identifies as “comic-frame strategies of incongruity that permit a communicator to be 
multi-voiced, to deflate abstractions and mystifications, and to symbolically span a 
variety of situations” (Waisanen 134). Meier, focusing on Colbert’s establishment of a 
legally recognized Super PAC during the 2012 presidential election cycle, concurs with 
Waisanen’s assessment. In creating a Super PAC in order to illustrate the problem posed 
by Super PACs, Meier argues that Colbert performed the role of a fool, making it easier 
for his audience to find fools in the heads of Super PACs, “where we would otherwise 
7 ​Again, differentiation between the genre of satire and the satiric frame is useful here. Fife defines satire as 
“a popular form of comedic social critique frequently theorized in terms of Kenneth Burke’s comic frame” 
(Fife 322). In contrast, the satire of which Burke speaks is a frame in which the framer attacks in the framed 
what really lies within themselves.  
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see villains” (Meier 276). In these articles, we see that Stewart and Colbert are comic 
rhetors encouraging change in attitude among their audiences. 
However, Stewart is no longer on the air. Colbert is, but his persona on ​Late Night 
conspicuously lacks the tongue-in-cheek conservatism practiced by his ​Colbert Report 
persona. The two have been succeeded by a slew of new hosts, themselves all members 
of the proverbial ​Daily Show​ alumni association. ​The Daily Show​ desk, where Stewart 
found his fame, is now manned by Trevor Noah. Samantha Bee, a longtime 
correspondent on ​The Daily Show​, has reached mainstream success on her new show on 
TBS, ​Full Frontal​. John Oliver, the focus of this study, is in the midst of his fourth 
season of his HBO show ​Last Week Tonight​.  
More so than ​Full Frontal​ or the new ​Daily Show​, Oliver parts from the format 
common among his show’s predecessors. Gone is the supporting cast of correspondents, 
who report on multiple stories over the course of a season. No matter where one looks, 
the satirically-assumed persona of a news personality talking head is nowhere to be 
found. Airing only once per week, ​Last Week Tonight​ is freed from the demands of a 
daily news cycle, allowing Oliver more agency in choosing what he discusses. As a 
result, the “main story” segments which occupy the bulk of his episodes’ runtimes are 
often oriented more thematically than episodically. The evolutions that ​Last Week 
Tonight​ has begat upon the alternative news source genre highlight the need for further 
study. In the section that follows, I apply the concepts of Burke’s comic and burlesque 
frames, using them to contextualize Oliver’s comic criticism within the developing 
alternative news source genre. Specifically, I argue that Oliver performs a version of 
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public intellect through which he enacts a mostly comic criticism of the American 
political system at large, and of the Republican Party and its candidate in particular.  
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Laughing and Learning: John Oliver’s Comic Performance of Public Intellect 
Since its premier in 2014, ​Last Week Tonight​ has developed its own, unique 
contribution to the genre of alternative news, making a few important changes to the 
segment-segment-interview format popularized by ​The Daily Show​ and ​The Colbert 
Report​. While the first segment satirically recaps some of the important events of the 
previous week, the following, “main story” segment typically lasts between fifteen and 
twenty minutes, often times occupying the remainder of the episode. These segments 
focus on topics of political or public importance, and may or may not be directly relevant 
to events which took place in the week prior to the release of the episode. As a means of 
making room for this extended, “main stories,” the “interview” portion of the program is 
notably absent.  
These “main story” segments are of particular interest in part because of the 
extent of their availability as compared to the rest of the show. ​Last Week Tonight​ airs on 
HBO, and thus the ability to watch it in full is contingent upon either having HBO or 
knowing someone willing to lend you their account information. Viewers using HBO GO 
or HBO NOW, the channel’s two online streaming services, have access only to the past 
year’s worth of episodes. However, following every episode, the newest “main story” 
segment is posted to the show’s Youtube channel, where it remains indefinitely and can 
be viewed by anyone.  
The rationale behind this decision is, no doubt, at least partly motivated by 
financial considerations. Making these highly popular segments  available on Youtube 8
8 ​The February 28th, 2016 episode of ​Last Week Tonight​–containing the “Donald Trump” 
segment–garnered around 6 million viewers on HBO and it’s streaming affiliates, while the Youtube video 
of the segment garnered 23.3 million (Zorthian). 
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earns the show and its parent company large amounts of money in ad revenue. 
However,whether or not it is motivated by factors other than money, the effort to make 
these segments widely available also bears a great deal of rhetorical significance. It is 
undeniable the wide availability of these segments also makes Oliver’s rhetorical 
criticism more widely accessible. Rather than being available only to HBO subscribers, 
the availability of those Youtube segments help Oliver’s long-form, thematically-oriented 
political critiques reach a much wider audience. Any number of internet users have 
access to these informative segments, whether they be about law enforcement, education 
policy, or Donald Trump; thus, the power they have to inform and change audience 
attitudes about those topics is dramatically increased.  
While Oliver has used this segment to speak on a wide variety of political issues 
since his show began, ​Last Week Tonight​’s third season took on a somewhat different 
character. Over the course of the season, which was filmed against the backdrop of the 
2016 presidential race, the election became increasingly difficult to ignore, becoming the 
focus of seven of Oliver’s “main story” segments between late February and late 
November. However, these analyses seldom, if ever, discussed polling data or which 
candidate was winning. Rather, Oliver used his time on camera to elucidate the 
complicated rules governing the presidential primary process, to investigate the 
feasibility of one of Donald Trump’s crucial policy positions, or to educate his viewers 
on the resources at their disposal in resisting Trump’s presidency.  
In this chapter, I conduct a Burkean frames analysis of these seven segments, 
using Burke’s ideas of the comic frame of acceptance and the burlesque frame of 
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rejection as a means of helping to understand Oliver’s performance of public intellect 
within American political discourse. This analysis will be divided into sections. First, I 
compare the role Oliver performs on ​Last Week Tonight​ to the role of the public 
intellectual, arguing that, while Oliver is a comedian and not a public intellectual, he does 
engage in a performance of public intellect not entirely unlike those performed by real 
public intellectuals. Second, I discuss the inherent relationship between Oliver’s 
performance of public intellect and the comic nature of his criticism. Third, I examine 
and discuss the implications of Oliver’s use of burlesque attacks in his humor, illustrating 
that Burkean frames often not as distinct as they seem. Finally, I contextualize Oliver’s 
model for civic discourse within the current landscape of American news media 
discourse.  
 
John Oliver and the Performance of Public Intellect 
The world of the public intellectual is, at least in some respect, the world of 
academia. As noted earlier, Etzioni identifies the academic intellectual as one of two 
major types of public intellectual (Etzioni 10), and she and Jacoby both note that the 
university has increasingly become the home of the public intellectual (Etzioni 10-11, 
Jacoby 14-15). Jacoby further argues that academic journals have become the dominant 
means through which public intellectuals communicate with their audiences (Jacoby 15). 
As Etzioni asserts, this shift has not necessarily affected the ability of the public 
intellectuals to reach their audience, but public intellectualism has, in the modern day, 
become an increasingly academic pursuit. 
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It is difficult to envision John Oliver as a member of this predominantly academic 
group. A tenured position at an accredited university may not be a requirement for the 
title of public intellectual, but it has certainly become a common characteristic. Oliver’s 
criticism, delivered not in writing or in person on a college campus but in front of a 
camera from behind a desk, is markedly different from those that typically characterize 
the public intellectual. Furthermore, ​Last Week Tonight​, at least in part, functions 
explicitly as a vehicle through which Oliver delivers satirical jokes and humorous jabs. 
Though these jokes and jabs undoubtedly serve purposes both rhetorical and political, 
seldom are they anywhere to be found in the writings of public intellectuals like Noam 
Chomsky, Cornel West, or Howard Zinn. Furthermore, the popularity of the university as 
a site of employment for public intellectuals exemplifies the devotion of public 
intellectual to explicitly intellectual pursuits. Oliver does not seem to share this devotion; 
despite its informative elements, ​Last Week Tonight​ is principally a comedy show, meant 
to make people laugh.  
However, while Oliver cannot be said to be a public intellectual himself, I argue 
that Oliver’s rhetoric on ​Last Week Tonight​ constitutes a performance of public intellect 
in that it fulfills some of the same important functions as the rhetoric of the public 
intellectual. Brouwer and Squires argue that the public intellectual speaks on “serious or 
grand issues… with exquisite depth of knowledge,” and is “listened to by important 
sectors of the public” (Brouwer & Squires 204). Furthermore, Posner sees the public 
intellectual as a “critical commentator addressing a nonspecialist audience on matters of 
broad public concern” (Posner 5). The performance of public intellect shall thus 
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characterized by two characteristics: knowledge in matters of broad public concern, and 
the ability to convey that knowledge in such a manner that it can be easily understood.  
Even a cursory examination of Oliver’s 2016 election coverage on ​Last Week 
Tonight​ reveals Oliver’s knowledge of matters of public concern. Between February and 
November of 2016, Oliver speaks knowledgeably on a myriad of topics. In one segment, 
he explains Donald Trump’s proposed border wall, approaching it from economic, 
logistical, and moral perspectives (Oliver 2016b). In another, he displays a sophisticated 
knowledge of the American democratic process while discussing primaries and caucuses 
(Oliver 2016c). In a third, he identifies a trend of conservative politicians likening feeling 
to fact, and argues this way of thinking is dangerous (Oliver 2016d). Even though he is 
not a public intellectual, the breadth of topics Oliver discusses on his show demonstrates 
a wide range of knowledge in various matters of public concern and covers these matters 
with a depth that goes beyond typical coverage.  
Oliver uses evidence-oriented argument as a means of shaping his critique so it 
can be easily understood by a non-specialist argument. In the “President-Elect Trump” 
segment, Oliver illustrates the problem of fake news by referencing a May 2016 study 
conducted by the Pew Research Center which found that 44% of American adults got 
news on Facebook (Gottfried & Shearer). He questions the effectiveness of a border wall 
in curbing unauthorized entry into the US by citing a separate Pew Research Center study 
which found that almost half of the undocumented workers in the United States had 
entered legally and overstayed their visas (“Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant 
Population”). In explaining the controversy surrounding the Trump Foundation, Oliver 
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includes a clip of a CBS news report detailing the misappropriation of funds by the 
foundation to purchase a portrait of Trump, which was then hung up at a Trump-owned 
hotel (Oliver 2016f 17:23). In each of these cases, Oliver gives his audience the means to 
find the source from which he learned that information. If he is referencing an article or 
poll, a box to the left of his face shows the title of the article and the name of the 
publication that released it. By openly referencing his sources, Oliver not only provides 
evidence for his knowledge–thereby increasing his credibility–but also makes that 
evidence available to his non-specialist audience for further scrutiny so they can reach 
their own conclusions. 
Oliver also makes his arguments more accessible to his non-specialist audience 
through the use of a rhetorical strategy called contextual clash. Contextual clash, as 
defined by Waisanen, refers to the act of comparing one thing to another from a different 
context as a means of understanding it (130). This strategy is a favorite of Oliver’s, who 
compares political concepts to apolitical ones as a means of elucidating those concepts. In 
response to a clip wherein then-DNC chair Debbie Wasserman-Schultz claimed that 
superdelegates would never determine the party’s nominee, Oliver argues, “you’re 
basically keeping rat poison in a jar next to the sugar saying ‘hey, it hasn’t been a 
problem yet’” (Oliver 2016c 8:42). This comparison uses the widely popular trope of rat 
poison in the kitchen to illustrate Oliver’s argument that superdelegates represent a 
problematic element of our democratic system not in their precedent of influencing 
election results, but in their theoretical capacity to do so. Oliver also compares building a 
wall to keep immigrants out to wearing a condom to prevent head lice, arguing neither 
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would be effective at solving the problem it was meant to (Oliver 2016b 12:40).  In each 
of these examples we see Oliver use an apolitical, hypothetical example in order to 
illustrate the political implications of Wasserman-Schultz’s comments. In doing so, he 
translates a political issue into an everyday context that his viewers can more easily 
understand. 
Oliver also uses emotional expressions of incredulity and frustration to build 
identification with his audience. Oliver begins each discussion of the 2016 election by 
providing an elaborate alternate name for the process as an indication of how frustrating 
it had been. On various occasions, he calls the 2016 election “A Horrifying Glimpse at 
Satan’s Pinterest Board 2016” (Oliver 2016e 0:04), “The electoral equivalent of seeing 
someone puking so you start puking and then someone else is puking and pretty soon 
everyone is puking 2016” (Oliver 2016f 0:01), and “I thought I wanted it to be over but 
now that it’s over I wish it was still going on because it turns out the ending is even 
worse, Twenty-Fucking-Sixteen” (Oliver 2016g 0:15). Furthermore, early in the 
“Primaries and Caucuses” segment, Oliver shows a clip of a screaming protester at the 
Nevada State Democratic Convention, and plays it again after explaining the process he 
sees as needlessly complicated, adding, “I don’t know if there’s a better summation of the 
primary process so far than that sound”  (Oliver 2016c 6:30). Amidst the horror of the 
2016 election, Oliver builds identification with his audience by using humor to express 
his own frustration with the process. 
While John Oliver does not fit the traditional definition of a public intellectual, he 
does fulfil the same rhetorical roles as a public intellectual. The breadth of topics he 
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covers over the course of a season demonstrates Oliver’s knowledge of a wide variety of 
topics and issues. Oliver’s use of evidence-oriented argument and contextual clash allow 
his audience a more accessible means to understand his argument, and his humorous 
frustration helps him build empathy with them. However, Oliver also performs public 
intellect in that his arguments engage in and contribute to moral deliberations. Etzioni 
argues that the public intellectual “must engage in moral deliberations because all major 
public and social policies that they routinely criticize have important moral dimensions” 
(Etzioni 3). Thus, in criticizing major public and social policies and the political status 
quo in general, Oliver necessarily engages in moral deliberation.  
 
John Oliver, the Comic Comic 
Given the importance of contributing to moral deliberations inherent within the 
performance of public intellect, it comes as no surprise that Oliver approaches the topics 
he discusses through Burke’s comic frame of acceptance. The comic frame positions the 
hero as intelligent and the villain who stands against them as mistaken or tricked (Burke 
41). The hero in the comic frame can affect change through discourse by correcting those 
mistaken elements of the villains’ thought. Thus, when used in public discourse, the 
comic frame has the capacity “to free society by creating a consciousness of the system 
as a system, revealing its inherent weaknesses, and preparing an aware populace to deal 
with them” (Carlson 1986 447). Oliver’s performance of public intellect, then, is 
inherently comic in that it promotes, encourages, and attempts to create awareness among 
its audience in order to affect change in their political system.  
 
Nott 71 
The application of the comic frame to ​Last Week Tonight​ reveals a pair of comic 
heroes and two comic villains. By constructing evidence-based arguments for a 
non-specialist audience, John Oliver positions himself as an intelligent comic hero 
working to influence how his audience participates in the American political system 
through discourse. In that act, Oliver necessarily enlists the help of a second hero in his 
audience who, by using the information he gives them to increase their democratic 
participation, might affect change to the system themselves. Oliver portrays himself as a 
comic hero because, through discourse, he seeks both to affect change himself and to 
compel his audience to do so. 
Standing opposite to Oliver and his audience is a shifting comic villain. In some 
segments, Oliver questions the reasoning of American voters tricked into believing 
Donald Trump was a strong candidate for president; through discourse, Oliver intends to 
reveal this trickery. In these segments, Oliver attempts directly to correct the mistaken 
political beliefs of American voters; thus, though his argument may give his audience the 
means to correct those misconceptions in Trump voters they know personally, he does 
not explicitly enlist his audience to join him in his effort. In other segments, Oliver’s 
villain is politicians like Donald Trump, party officials, or media outlets who are 
mistaken in their contentedness with the political status quo. In combating these villains, 
Oliver must enlist his audience as the second hero because the desired result of discourse 
in the comic frame is change to the status quo which, in a democracy, can only be 
achieved through public participation. Depending on the villain Oliver is contesting, he 
asks more or less of his audience as a secondary hero.  
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Oliver uses his performance of public intellect to embody a comic hero by 
correcting the mistaken ideas of voters tricked into supporting Donald Trump. In Oliver’s 
first segment on Trump, which was also the first “main story” segment related to the 
2016 election, Oliver disputes three claims about Trump commonly made by his 
supporters: that he tells the truth, that he is a strong leader, and that he is a successful 
businessman whose business acumen would translate well to the presidency (Oliver 
2016a 2:20). He contests these notions in order; first, he points to several occasions on 
which he had lied, including a one case in which Trump falsely claimed to have been 
invited on ​Last Week Tonight​ (Oliver 2016a 2:51). Then, he calls Trump’s toughness into 
question by pointing out how poorly Trump receives comments about the size of his 
hands (Oliver 2016a 6:00), then disputing Trump’s business success by providing several 
examples of his business failures, including Trump Steaks, which could only be 
purchased at The Sharper Image (Oliver 2016a 11:02). In this segment, Oliver directly 
refutes claims made of Trump by his supporters, hoping to enlighten voters who have 
been tricked by Trump’s public persona by revealing the candidate’s true nature in the 
process. 
In the “Scandals” segment, aired just before the first presidential debate, Oliver 
addresses the misconceptions of voters who opposed Hillary Clinton because of the 
scandals that dogged her throughout the campaign and positions those voters as villains 
tricked into a false belief that the ethical failings of Clinton and Trump were equivalent. 
After opening the segment with a supercut of news clips relating to Hillary Clinton’s 
scandals (Oliver 2016f 0:26), Oliver examines two often-discussed examples–her use of a 
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primate email server and the activity of the Clinton Foundation during her time as 
Secretary of State–and argues that both look bad, but that “the closer you look, the less 
[wrongdoing] you actually find” (Oliver 2016f 12:15). Oliver argues that Trump’s 
scandals, which include his refusal to leave his company to a blind trust should he 
become president, the Donald J. Trump foundation’s misappropriation of funds to 
purchase portraits, and an ongoing class-action lawsuit related to Trump University, are 
“quantifiably worse” (Oliver 2016f 12:28). Though Oliver laments the extent to which 
scandals dominated the 2016 election, he argues that it is “dangerous” to believe them to 
be equal on both sides (Oliver 2016f 20:00). In this segment, Oliver attempts to set right 
the attitudes of voters tricked by conservative politicians and the news media into 
believing this false equivalency, fulfilling an essentially comic duty.  
In the case of Oliver’s analysis of Trump’s proposed border well, there are two 
villains: Trump, and the voters who mistakenly believe the wall to be a good idea. Oliver 
notes the popularity of the proposal among Trump’s supporters, and the central role it 
played in Trump’s platform, and acknowledges the need to “take a serious proposal by a 
serious candidate, seriously” (Oliver 2016b 1:26). First considering the proposal from an 
economic perspective, Oliver argues that the wall would cost significantly more than the 
$4-10 billion projected by Trump, instead referencing a ​Washington Post​ article which in 
turn referenced a report issued by Bernstein Research quoting the cost of the wall at 
around $25 billion (Oliver 2016b 1:48, 3:42). Oliver further asserts that the construction 
of the wall would logistical challenges beyond its cost, would be ineffective in preventing 
undocumented workers from entering the country, and that the perceived threat of 
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undocumented immigrants was overblown (Oliver 2016b 9:34, 12:25, 14:45). In this 
segment, Oliver frames Trump as a villain for being wrong about the cost and 
effectiveness of the wall, and his voters as villains for believing those misconceptions. 
The framing of Trump’s supporters as the villains in this case is at least somewhat 
implicit. In justifying his discussion of the wall by citing the proposal’s popularity, Oliver 
ties that discussion to not only Trump, but his voters (Oliver 2016b 0:52). Thus, in using 
evidence-oriented argument to argue that building the wall would be a mistake, he 
necessarily argues that the people supporting Trump because he would build the border 
wall are also mistaken. This in turn requires that Oliver also frame Trump as a villain 
because he is proposing a misguided project. By disputing Trump’s projected cost and 
illustrating that it would in fact cost a great deal more both initially and over time, Oliver 
establishes that Trump’s idea of what the wall would cost is mistaken. Oliver further 
argues that the wall would be ineffective by pointing to evidence suggesting it would do 
little to stem the illegal immigration and drug trafficking that it sought to prevent. In 
correcting the misconceptions about the economic feasibility and effectiveness of the 
wall, Oliver engages in an attempt to change the attitudes of Trump supporters towards 
their preferred candidate.  
Oliver also identifies politicians, parties, or other groups are the villains in 
Oliver’s criticisms. In the “Primaries and Caucuses” segment, Oliver argues that both 
political parties have been misguided in their formulation of primary rules by the desire 
to preserve the wishes of the party (Oliver 2016c 13:48). In the “Republican National 
Convention” segment, he attacks Republican politicians like Newt Gingrich for equating 
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widely-held feelings with facts (Oliver 2016d 4:00). In his season-ending 
“President-Elect Trump” segment, Oliver attributes Trump’s victory in part to bad 
coverage by a news media more interested than covering the oddity of his candidacy than 
the implications of it (Oliver 2016g 10:10). In these situations, Oliver does not attack 
misled voters, but figures in politics and news media who are mistaken in their support 
for or contentedness with the political status quo.  
In combatting these more institutional villains, Oliver enlists his audience as 
comic heroes themselves by raising their awareness of the figures and systems of 
authority in American government, thus empowering them to reform those systems 
themselves through discourse. Oliver also uses his main segments as a means to explain 
important processes in American democracy to his viewers, as is evident in his segment 
on presidential primaries and caucuses. In this segment, filmed against the backdrop of a 
tumultuous Democratic primary battle between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, 
Oliver decries what he sees as a needlessly complicated process on both sides of the aisle, 
arguing that “almost every part of [the primary process] is difficult to defend” (Oliver 
2016c 3:22). Outlining the frequently complicated procedures by which both the 
Democratic and Republican parties select their nominees, Oliver illuminates several 
safeguards built into both processes which give the two parties considerable say in 
choosing their nominee, including an example in which the North Dakota Republican 
Party chose to have neither a primary nor a caucus, instead just choosing their state’s 
delegates on their own (Oliver 2016c 11:09). Concluding that the American primary 
system is in need of reform, Oliver encourage his viewers to advocate for such reforms 
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when the election is over (Oliver 2016c 13:48). In this segment, Oliver frames the two 
parties as mistaken villains who can only be defeated through more institutional reform. 
Oliver combats these villains by highlighting the need for reform then proposing to his 
audience a discursive means by which they might advocate for that reform, thereby 
engaging in a process of hero-making where Oliver passes the role of the comic hero 
from himself to his audience. 
Following Trump’s electoral victory, Oliver fulfils his role as a comic hero by 
offering his audience a discursive solution to the new problem posed by Trump’s 
presidency. Oliver uses the segment to answer two questions: “how the fuck did we get 
here, and what the fuck do we do now?” (Oliver 2016g 4:34). After accusing the 
mainstream news media of failing to take Trump seriously early in his campaign and 
detailing the problem posed by the propagation of misinformation by hyper-partisan news 
sites, thus answering the first of his questions, Oliver turns his attention to what can be 
done in the next four years (Oliver 2016g 10:10). He implores his audience to “fight 
constantly,” and provides his audience with a long list of organizations in need of 
donations that would help to resist Trump (Oliver 2016g 18:24). Here, Oliver seeks to 
raise audience awareness on a number of issues, among which are the failings of the 
American news media, the dangers posed by Trump’s policy agenda, and the avenues of 
resistance available to his audience. In so empowering his audience, Oliver prepares them 
to work to amend the weaknesses of the American political system.  
Throughout his 2016 election coverage, Oliver consistently produces segments 
whose tricked or mistaken villains are generally Donald Trump, other republicans, and 
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the misguided ideas they advocate, or the citizens who support those politicians and 
ideals. He seeks to mitigate the problems posed by these villains though discourse by 
correcting voters’ and politicians’ mistaken beliefs or by revealing some form of trickery. 
In doing so, he also raises his audience’s awareness of these issues and offers them 
advice on how they might work to correct him.  
However, Oliver’s criticism is also comic in that it seeks not to destroy the 
existing social order, but to correct the problems within it. Discourse in the comic frame 
necessarily accepts the structures of authority before it, arguing for reform rather than 
revolution. Oliver firmly argues that both parties ought to make changes to their primary 
rules and implores his audience to hold them accountable to do so by encouraging them 
all to call their representatives on the same date (February 2, 2017), but does not go far 
enough as to suggest that primaries should be abandoned (Oliver 2016c 13:30). Likewise, 
Oliver finds it lamentable that both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have their ethical 
failings, but urges his audience to accept that most politicians have “at least a few” such 
failings rather than encouraging them to hold politicians to a higher standard (Oliver 
2016f 20:00). In these cases Oliver clearly identifies problems within the system, but 
ultimately argues that the solution to these problems can be found through targeted 
reform of the system rather than a complete overhaul. The comic frame is thus the 
dominant frame of Oliver’s rhetoric, because accepts existing systems of political 
authority while positioning himself and his audience as intelligent heroes ready to use 
discourse to correct the wrongs done to that system by mistaken or tricked villains; his 
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rhetoric does not advocate total revolution, but nonetheless works to build hope for 
change.  
 
Oliver vs. the Walking, Talking Brush Fire 
But while the comic frame is the dominant frame of Oliver’s rhetoric, it is not the 
only one at work in his arguments. As noted earlier, Burke argues that no one frame can 
be “isolated in its chemical purity,” and that frames “overlap upon one another, involving 
the qualitative matter of emphasis” (Burke 57). So while Oliver’s arguments are given 
predominantly through a comic frame of acceptance, they also contain elements of a 
burlesque frame of rejection. The burlesque frame, as described by Burke, is a frame 
through which one rejects a structure of authority by attacking its externalities (Burke 
54-55). In doing so, the discursive actor in the burlesque frame seeks to reduce their 
opponent to absurdity (Burke 55). It can be argued, then, that the burlesque frame is the 
frame of the insult comic.  
In his humor, Oliver directs burlesque insults at his mistaken politician villains, 
using a variety of rhetorical strategies to reduce their character and beliefs to absurdities. 
Oliver frequently refers to Trump not by name, but by a series of burlesque jabs. 
Depending on the week, Oliver might refer to Trump as “America’s walking, talking 
brush fire” (Oliver 2016c 0:20), an “unambiguously racist scarecrow stuffed with 
scrunched up copies of Jugs magazines” (Oliver 2016f 1:33), or “a human ‘what is wrong 
with this picture’” (Oliver 2016g 5:40). Like many other media personalities, Oliver 
made jokes at the expense of the size of Trump’s hands (Oliver 2016b 2:00), and the 
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orangey hue of his skin (Oliver 2016f 16:15). In his discussion of the Democratic 
National Convention, Oliver played a clip from Trump’s speech at the RNC in which the 
candidate remarked that, under Obama, the United States had endured “one international 
humiliation after another,” then stating that Trump was the only recent international 
humiliation he could think of (Oliver 2016e 9:07). Even the very mention of Trump by 
Oliver frequently entails the inclusion of a photo of the candidate making a face the 
audience finds humorous. These burlesque attacks criticize Trump by portraying him in 
ridiculous or absurd terms. 
These burlesque insults do not reject Trump’s candidacy, but they do reject his 
legitimacy as a potential leader of the American people and impugn his intelligence. 
Oliver recognizes the danger posed by Trump’s candidacy, framing the candidate and his 
policies as the threat that might be defeated through comic discourse, the burlesque 
insults by which Oliver refers to Trump and the photos he uses to represent the candidate 
also frame him as an absurd figure. Even after Trump’s victory, Oliver portrays the 
newly-elected president as an utter buffoon, dubbing the ​Curb Your Enthusiasm​ theme 
song over a video clip of Trump meeting with President Obama to suggest that Trump is 
in over his head (Oliver 2016g 3:09). Oliver’s consistent tendency to refer to Trump in 
humorous insults and to frame the candidate as a fool echoes the rhetoric of civil rights 
leader Ralph David Abernathy, who portrayed white segregationists “as bumbling, 
ridiculous, and impotent” figures who were “ultimately powerless either to grant or to 
stand in the way of Blacks' demands for justice” (Selby 142-143). Oliver’s use of 
burlesque insults within his comic criticism simultaneously accepts and addresses the 
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reality of his threat while also portraying his very existence as absurd and even laughable, 
thus making him less dangerous and more easily defeated as a villain.  
Oliver uses contextual clash not only as an informational tool, as discussed 
earlier, but also as a weapon with which to attack his opponents with burlesque humor. In 
the “Border Wall” Oliver argues the wall is “a big, dumb thing that only gets more 
expensive over time,” comparing the proposal to the act of buying a pet walrus (Oliver 
2016b 4:43). Oliver’s mention of the idea of buying a pet walrus is accompanied by an 
edited photo of a young man standing on a city street holding a walrus on a leash. By 
portraying a walrus and its owner in a metropolitan environment, Oliver tacitly calls the 
viewer to question the logistics of such an arrangement. What landlord would be willing 
to let a tenant keep a walrus in their apartment? How would the walrus’ owner get it up 
and down stairs? Are they financially prepared to pay for a bucket of sea cucumbers on a 
regular basis (Oliver 2016b 4:48)? There are no easy answers to these questions; taking 
care of a walrus in a city is an obviously absurd thing to attempt. By comparing Trump’s 
wall to such an act, Oliver ties the proposal to that same absurdity.  
We find a similar, though more complex, case in Oliver’s analysis of the 
Democratic National Convention. Oliver claims that other western democracies do not 
understand Trump’s candidacy “any more than they understand the menu at Guy Fieri’s 
American Kitchen,” impersonating a Frenchman to ask Americans, “Why do you do this 
to yourself” (Oliver 2016e 3:51). Oliver compares Trump to Fieri, a chef and food 
television personality known for his frosted tips, his “high-wattage passion for no-collar 
American food,” and his loud and rambunctious mannerisms (Wells). Thus, when he asks 
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why Americans would do “this” to themselves, he identifies two things as “this:” Guy 
Fieri’s absurdly American cuisine and personality, and the viability of Donald Trump as a 
candidate. In doing so, Oliver necessarily applies the absurdity of the former to the latter.  
Oliver’s assumption of a French accent in making this comparison is crucial to the 
effectiveness of his burlesque contextual clash because, in using that accent, Oliver 
employs a strategy called parodic polyglossia. Waisanen describes parodic polyglossia as 
the mixing of two voices to expand perspectives on social issues within American politics 
and culture (Waisanen 123). In this example, Oliver switches between two voices; his 
own, and that of the Frenchman. That the impression Oliver calls upon is that of a 
Frenchman is significant in that it contextualizes both sides of the comparison. It would 
be unsurprising for someone from France, a country known for its love of fine dining, to 
question why an American would willingly subject themselves to the offerings of Fieri’s 
definitively un-fine dining establishments. Likewise, it is easy to imagine someone from 
France, another western democracy known for high culture, to find Trump’s candidacy 
perplexing and hard to comprehend. In this case, Oliver’s use of parodic polyglossia 
contextualizes foreign bewilderment at both American concepts, thus acting as a lynchpin 
for Oliver’s contextual clash comparison. 
Oliver also uses parodic polyglossia independently of contextual clash as a means 
of reducing certain politicians and their ideas to absurdity. In the “President-Elect 
Trump” segment as a means of delegitimizing figures and ideas with which Oliver 
disagrees. In these examples, Oliver speaks both as himselves and as the politicians he is 
attacking. Oliver uses this strategy twice in the segment. In illustrating the hypocrisy of 
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Republican politicians who had, at first, opposed Trump but later came to support him, 
Oliver plays a clip of Senator Ted Cruz phone banking for Trump, comments as himself 
on how sad it makes him to watch Cruz campaign for an opponent who he fought hard 
against in the primary. Then, switching voices, Oliver imagines aloud his own version of 
what Cruz might be saying to his callers: “Hi, this is Ted Cruz. Just calling to remind you 
to vote for a man who insulted my wife and said my dad helped kill JFK. Anyway, life 
has no meaning, thank you, I want to die” (Oliver 2016g 16:42). In engaging in a parodic 
impersonation of Ted Cruz making calls for Trump, Oliver specifically mentions two 
personal or conspiratorial attacks Trump made on Cruz’s family, then closes with an 
ironic expression of regret. The mention of those events serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
makes clear the reasons why one in Cruz’s position might find the idea of campaigning 
for Trump unappealing; secondly, Oliver’s parodic statement that “life has no meaning” 
frames Cruz’s willingness to campaign for Trump as an embarrassing and demoralizing 
betrayal of self-respect. In doing so, he seeks to reduce Cruz’s stature as a candidate 
while also pointing out the hypocrisy inherent within the Republican Party’s embrace of 
Trump. 
Just minutes after his Cruz impersonation, he uses parodic polyglossia a second 
time, assuming both his own voice and a puritanical parody of Vice President-elect Mike 
Pence’s voice to compare Pence’s views on abortion to Puritan fears of witches. Oliver 
laments that his hopes that Trump might be impeached are dashed when he considers that 
Pence would be the one to replace him, then showing a photoshopped picture of Pence 
dressed as a puritan mocking his position on abortion by assuming his voice to jokingly 
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ask, “Oh, what’s that you say? Her pregnancy was terminated before birth? Well, clearly, 
she’s a witch. Hold a funeral for the fetus and throw the mother in a lake” (Oliver 2016g 
18:01). In this instance, Oliver references both Pence’s stance as a long-time, 
unapologetic opponent of abortion (Ertelt), a position many of his fellow conservatives 
share, and a specific law passed in the state of Texas requiring “funerals” to be held for 
aborted fetuses (Schmidt). Oliver’s use of parodic polyglossia in this example portrays 
Pence and his colleagues’ views on abortion as draconian, outdated, and absurd and also 
makes reference to an example of why people holding that outdated mindset are 
dangerous when given political power, both acknowledging the danger of the pro-life 
position while rejecting its legitimacy.  
Thus, this example demonstrates an important truth about the mechanics of 
Burkean frames. As Burke argues, no frame can be “isolated in its chemical purity;” 
rather, frames “overlap upon one another, involving the qualitative matter of emphasis” 
(Burke 57).While Oliver’s burlesque attacks function partly as a means of comedy, they 
also function as comic criticism because the delegitimization of political figures and 
positions constitutes an effort to change the status quo through discourse. Within every 
name Oliver calls Trump lies the comic argument that Trump’s candidacy presents a 
negative situation for American democracy. Oliver firmly encourages his viewers to take 
whatever steps necessary to remind themselves that Trump’s victory “is not normal” 
(Oliver 2016g 22:23). In making several jokes at Trump’s expense, Oliver essentially 
refuses to take Trump seriously, thus implicitly reiterating the abnormality and 
unacceptability of Trump’s candidacy, and subsequently, his presidency.  
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Likewise, the parodic polyglossia Oliver uses to criticize Cruz and Pence is both 
burlesque and comic because, in poking fun at the two politicians for their beliefs and 
actions, it both makes legitimate comic criticisms of both Cruz and Pence’s views and 
actions, and frames those views and actions as absurd. Within Oliver’s caricature of Cruz 
campaigning for Trump lies the argument that Cruz in particular, as well as politicians in 
general, ought to be more principled in their actions. Likewise, Oliver’s portrayal of 
Pence may seem, at least to some extent, an exaggeration, but in framing it as such, 
Oliver asks his to consider the the religious pro-life argument through a similar lens 
through which they already understand the pro-witch-drowning argument. Thus, this 
criticism attempts creating change through discourse by attempting to persuade viewers 
to consider the pro-life argument as a less legitimate political position. 
 
Oliver’s Barrier 
However, even as these jokes serve as comic criticism meant to frame these 
candidates and ideas as mistaken or foolish, they also create a barrier that may dissuade 
some members of the American electorate–specifically conservatives–from watching the 
show. When Oliver opens his segment on Trump’s proposed border wall by comparing 
his supporters’ enthusiasm for the proposal to a high school health teacher’s enthusiasm 
for dental dams and follows the comparison directly with a joke about dental dams 
sounding good but not being so in practice, he risks alienating viewers who do not 
already agree that that enthusiasm is high (Oliver 2016b 0:47). Likewise, conservative 
viewers may not stick around to hear Oliver’s explanation of why both parties’ primary 
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systems are dearly in need of reform when Oliver opens the segment by calling their 
candidate of choice a “walking, talking brush fire” (Oliver 2016c 0:16). Oliver’s 
important discussion of the Republican Party’s representation of feeling as fact can’t 
reach viewers who closed the video three minutes prior, when he referred to the RNC as 
“the most apocalyptic thing ever to happen” to Cleveland, a city whose river “has 
repeatedly caught fire” (Oliver 2016d 0:04). Oliver’s comedy often frames his political 
positions not as opinions, but as undeniable precepts; in doing so, he risks alienating 
those who do not already agree with him. 
This barrier is not necessarily problematic. Oliver openly admits that his show 
“has a viewpoint,” and argues that a healthy media diet must include more than just 
sources which confirm one’s viewpoint (Oliver 2016g 11:51). As was the case for Jon 
Stewart before him, Oliver is not a journalist, and therefore need not adhere to the same 
rules of objectivity as journalists due. Rather than being tied to objectivity, Oliver openly 
and explicitly ties himself to a notion of earnestness. Oliver’s inclusion of evidence for 
the majority of his claims, whether that evidence takes the form of polls, studies, news 
media artifacts, and the words of politicians themselves, indicates a desire to demonstrate 
an informed position, and his frequent expressions of exasperation show his viewers that 
he truly believes his arguments. In building his arguments as such, Oliver expresses an 
earnest desire to inform his viewers, even as he makes his own opinion clear in the 
process. 
This barrier also aids Oliver in his process of making a comic hero out of the 
audience. While conservative Americans might be dissuaded from watching ​Last Week 
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Tonight​ because of Oliver’s use of burlesque humor to reject the legitimacy of 
conservative politicians and their political beliefs, progressives are unlikely to run into 
the same problem; of all the “main story” segments discussing the 2016 election, only 
two–“Democratic National Convention” and “Scandals”–devote significant time to 
Hillary Clinton or the Democratic Party. In these segments, Oliver never questions the 
legitimacy of progressive political positions, and while he does criticize the Democratic 
Party for their imperfect primary system (Oliver 2016c) and Hillary Clinton for her 
ethical failings (Oliver 2016f), he reserves burlesque insults for the “walking, talking, 
brushfire” running against her. In reducing to absurdity politicians and policy positions 
progressives already tend to find contemptible, he frames those villains as being weak, 
thereby empowering his audience to affect change.  
 
John Oliver and the News Media 
In conclusion, it is necessary to contextualize ​Last Week Tonight​ and John Oliver 
as a new development in the genre of progressively-oriented comedy-news shows hosted 
by comic humorists bound by a commitment to earnestness. Like his predecessors, Oliver 
uses rhetorical strategies such as evidence-oriented argument, contextual clash, and 
parodic polyglossia to make a comic criticism of the American political system, but his 
performance of public intellect is more pronounced than that of any late night 
comedy-news hosts before him. Oliver’s attempt to arm his voters with the necessary 
knowledge and resources to better understand and participate in their political system is 
explicit; he asks his viewers to call their representatives to demand reform to the primary 
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process (Oliver 2016c), and offers them a rubric for how to resist the Trump 
administration (Oliver 2016g). While someone very well might learn from ​The Daily 
Show​, ​Last Week Tonight​ constitutes a new evolution in the genre because Oliver 
continually and actively works to inform his audience.  
However, the political bias which has characterized this genre remains present in 
Last Week Tonight​. Like his predecessors in Bill Maher, Stewart, and Stephen Colbert, as 
well as his contemporaries like Samantha Bee, Stephen Colbert, Seth Meyers, Trevor 
Noah, and Larry Wilmore, Oliver is unabashedly liberal and openly biased. Like his 
predecessors and contemporaries, the villains of Oliver’s frame of perception are 
necessarily mistaken, foolish, ridiculous, and absurd. This situates him firmly within a 
larger American political discourse, one firmly characterized by division.  
Last Week Tonight​ exists during a time in which the American news media 
environment is fundamentally divided. By and large, our news is presented to us through 
a transition frame not unlike the Grotesque and Didactic frames described by Burke; 
because there is a lack of consensus on what the truth is, different news outlets propagate 
different narratives supported by different facts (or, in some cases, feelings). These 
different narratives are frequently offered along partisan lines, and this environment 
frequently breeds conflict. That Oliver and his fellow late night comedy news hosts are 
part of this politically fraught discourse is undeniable; of the seven segments pertaining 
to the 2016 election that aired in ​Last Week Tonight​’s third season, only two devoted 
significant time to Hillary Clinton, while Donald Trump and his candidacy received 
significant time in all seven. It is encouraging, then, that Oliver does not deny it, and 
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more encouraging still that he urges his viewers to work to get their news from a variety 
of sources, and not just from biased like ​Last Week Tonight​. Oliver’s openness about his 
bias thus provides an example that other political commentators, on both the progressive 
and conservative sides of the spectrum, would do well to follow.  
Furthermore, while the political bias inherent within ​Last Week Tonight​ makes it a 
far-from-perfect source of news, the show does present an interesting model for civic 
discourse worthy of emulation by more official news sources. In the entirety of his 2016 
election coverage, Oliver rarely mentions polls on candidate preference, choosing instead 
to focus on sharing important information about the candidates with his audience. This 
stands in sharp contrast to mainstream news outlets, for whom such polls are an 
all-too-frequent topic of conversation. Furthermore, Oliver approaches his topics 
thematically rather than episodically; rather than covering the election as a series of new 
developments, he devotes one major segment to Trump’s business ties, one to his border 
wall proposal, one to the primary processes of both parties, one to each party’s 
convention, one to each candidate’s past scandals, and one to understanding how to 
proceed following Trump’s victories. This allows his audience to understand the election 
topic-by-topic rather than development-by-development. The application of this model to 
a mainstream news context could be helpful because it would help American voters make 
a more informed decision, thus working to fulfill an important duty of the news media at 
large.  
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“That’s Our Show”: John Oliver and the Future of Civic Discourse 
This study is an initial exploration of John Oliver as a social critic in American 
civic discourse. Like his predecessors and contemporaries, he uses both humor and satire 
as vehicles to conduct a criticism of the American political system and the media that 
covers it. However, ​Last Week Tonight​ is unique in its focus on constructing arguments 
meant to inform the show’s audience. In making these arguments, Oliver works to 
prepare his viewers for political participation both during and after the 2016 election 
season, engaging in a performance of public intellect.  Evidence-oriented argument, 
contextual clash, and parodic polyglossia all prove themselves useful tools for Oliver, 
who uses them to frame himself as an intelligent comic hero setting out to correct 
mistaken media members and conservative politicians, and to prevent or mitigate the 
damage posed by the voters tricked into supporting those candidates’ mistaken ideas. The 
burlesque attacks Oliver humorously hurls at the villains of his criticisms are both a boon 
and a hinderance to the informative goals of his comic criticism; they strengthen his 
argument by reducing those villains’ beliefs to absurdity, thus compounding the 
perception of those villains as foolish and mistaken, but also reveal Oliver’s own biases, 
thereby acting as a potential barrier between him and conservative Americans.  
However, ​Last Week Tonight​ and its host remain a topic ripe for further academic 
research. This study includes only election-related “main story” segments because those 
segments provide a strong example of Oliver’s arguments as a means of arming his 
audience for political participation. Thus, a number of questions remain to be answered. 
How does his rhetoric in his discussions of organizations like FIFA or topics like prisoner 
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reentry differ from that of his election-related coverage? How is his role as a rhetor 
speaking to a predominantly American audience influenced by his status as a British 
ex-patriot? In what ways does Oliver’s satirical founding of a televangelist church or a 
debt buying agency draw from and expand upon similar strategies used by Stephen 
Colbert? These are only a few avenues of academic inquiry into ​Last Week Tonight​.  
Academics should also look further than John Oliver, studying his contemporaries 
as well. Stephen Colbert still remains an active voice in late night comedy via his show 
on CBS, and the nature of his rhetorical performance has undoubtedly changed since he 
filed his last ​Colbert Report​. On ​The Daily Show​, Trevor Noah, a mixed-race comedian 
born in South Africa, lends his unique background to his coverage, speaking as both a 
black man and an immigrant. Samantha Bee’s ​Full Frontal​ brought, at long last, a female 
voice to the genre, offering a crucial new perspective to the comedy-news conversation. 
With four hosts making important contributions to this country’s political conversations, 
the late night comedy-news show is thriving, and scholars should explore the rhetoric 
they use as fully as possible. Do these hosts speak through the same comic and burlesque 
frames that Oliver does? To what extent, and through what means, do they work to 
inform their voters? How do their strategies differ from Oliver’s?  
These questions offer important insight not only to the study genre of 
comedy-news and alternative news sources, but to the study of American discourse in 
general. The study not only of ​Last Week Tonight​, but also of ​The Late Show​, ​The Daily 
Show​, and ​Full Frontal​, as artifacts of civic rhetoric is crucial to developing a complete 
understanding of this moment in American civic discourse. In an environment where the 
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news is so highly politicized, and where different outlets offer different versions of the 
truth, the need for metacriticism of the American news media is as great now as it has 
ever been. Thus, the most important duty Oliver and his fellow hosts fulfil as comic 
heroes is that informing their viewers. Within American democracy, no one person can 
make a change; even presidents can only reach office after garnering the support of tens 
of millions of voters. Thus, although they are billed as comedy shows, the arguments 
made by Oliver or Noah or Bee are no laughing matter. These hosts affect change by 
affecting the American public’s attitudes. By understanding their rhetoric, we gain crucial 
insight into the function of how these hosts conduct that communication. 
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